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GLOSSARY 
Term       Definition     
African socialism        The adoption of  African “traditional” values to share resources equally. 
Decolonization             A progressive act of dismantling colonial domination. 
Arusha Declaration   A 1967 political statement on socio-economic development and  
                   Tanzania’s commitment to socialism. Also known as TANU’s Policy on  
                                     Socialism and Self-Reliance. 
Emir       Arabic term for leader. Nigerian context, a traditional leader in 
   the Muslim northern regions of Nigeria. 
Kipande                       An identity document that included employment information, worn                        
                                     around the neck during British colonial rule in Kenya. 
Lagosian                      A colloquial term used to refer to a resident of metropolitan Lagos,  
                                     Nigeria. 
Malaya                         Swahili term for ‘prostitute.’ In colonial Kenya, the term referred to  
Malaya (continued)     prostitutes who also rendered domestic services to patrons. 
Oba      A title for a Yoruba or Edo king in Nigeria. 
Primate City                A term, coined by Geographer Mark Jefferson to describe a country’s 
                 largest city that is unrivaled in population size, economic activity and 
                                       political significance. 
Ujamaa                          Swahili term for “brotherhood” or “family hood.” In Tanzanian context, 
                                        used to conceptualize African socialism. 
Villagization                  A policy that forcefully groups rural people to work on communal 
                   is often used synonymously with collectivization.  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Introduction 
On 9 March 2015, University of Cape Town (UCT) student Chumani Maxwele smeared 
human feces on a statue commemorating the late British colonialist and diamond magnate, Cecil 
Rhodes. The act sparked a national movement dubbed Rhodes Must Fall (RMF). Maxwele, 
other UCT students, faculty and staff demanded the removal of the statue and what they called 
the decolonization of the university.  The campaign spread across South African universities and 1
received support from international universities, notably from the University of Oxford, Rhodes’ 
alma mater.  Participants in the RMF movement called for the university space to be rid of not 2
only plaques and statues that commemorated oppressive colonial figures but also legacies of 
colonialism, namely white supremacy, institutional racism, and economic inequality. This is 
evident in the UCT Rhodes Must Fall Mission Statement:  
We want to be clear that this movement is not just concerned with the removal of a 
statue. The statue has great symbolic power; it glorifies a mass-murderer who 
exploited black labour and stole land from indigenous people. Its presence erases 
black history and is an act of violence against black students, workers and staff – by 
“black” we refer to all people of color. The statue was therefore the natural starting 
point of this movement. Its removal will not mark the end but the beginning of the 
long overdue process of decolonizing this university.  3
Andrew Harding, “Cecil Rhodes monument: A necessary anger?” BBC News, April 11, 2015, sec. Africa. http://1
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32248605.
 Jessica Elgot, “‘Take It Down!’: Rhodes Must Fall Campaign Marches through Oxford.” The Guardian, March 9, 2
2016, sec. Education. http://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/mar/09/take-it-down-rhodes-must-fall-campaign-
marches-through-oxford.
 UCT Rhodes Must Fall’ Facebook Page, “UCT Rhodes Must Fall Mission Statement,” accessed April 19, 2016, 3
https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/posts/1559394444336048
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Many historians critical of Rhodes agree with the sentiments of the Rhodes Must Fall campaign. 
Rhodes was a firm advocate of British imperialism as he believed the Anglo-Saxon was superior 
over all races.  Believing Black Africans to be “in a state of barbarism,” he actively supported 4
colonial policies that subjugated Black Africans.    5
 On 9 April 2015, the statue of Rhodes was removed from the University of Cape Town 
grounds. The RMF movement contributes to a long history of African attempts to decolonize 
physical spaces. While members of RMF protested to purge universities of colonial legacies, in 
the twentieth century, colonized Africans as well as postcolonial African leaders made efforts to 
rid cities of problems associated with imperialism. Which raises the question:what effects did 
colonial policies have on African urban dwellers? How did Africans resist oppressive imperial 
forces within the city? How did African leaders and urban planners address the challenges 
inherited from colonialism? Finally, how effective were these anti-colonial actions? This thesis 
will primarily focus on the relocation of African national capitals as a means of decolonizing the 
urban space. Throughout, this thesis will examine the progress made from the colonial period to 
the postcolonial period towards dismantling colonial legacies. In doing so, this historical 
investigation illuminates present-day struggles such as the Rhodes Must Fall Movement. 
In studies of the colonial African cities, scholars such as Gwendolyn Wright, Garth Myers 
and Kai Gutschow argue that the colonial city was designed with little respect for the cultures or 
 Dickinson Mungazi,The Struggle for Social Change in Southern Africa: Visions of Liberty (New York: Crane 4
Russak, 1989), 29-30; Richard Parry,”'In a Sense Citizens, but Not Altogether Citizens…’: Rhodes, Race, and the 
Ideology of Segregation at the Cape in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue 
Canadienne des Études Africaines 17, no.3 (1983):377-391; Dickson A. Mungazi,The Mind of Black Africa, 
(Westport: Praeger Publishers,1996), 26-28.
 F. Verschoyle, Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and Speeches, 1881-1900, (London: Chapman and Hill, 1900), 5
367; Stanlake Samkange, What Rhodes Really Said About Africans (Harare: Harare Publishing House, 1982),15.
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dignity of Africans. Rather, it was seen as a means to civilize the colonized Africans and as a 
means to expose Africans to a “superior” European culture.  Wright concluded that French urban 6
planers viewed colonial cities as social experiments and the testing ground for solutions to solve 
Paris’ urban woes. Kenyan historians Kefa Otiso and Godwin Murunga argued that British 
colonial urban policy actively discouraged Africans from residing in colonial cities. Otiso argues 
that the British sought to keep Africans bound to rural subsistence farming in a bid to protect the 
capitalist interests of White settlers.  Murunga argued further that the colonial cities were 7
governed by strict policies of racial segregation that privileged Europeans at the expense of 
Africans. Maurice Amutabi went on to argue that colonial cities symbolically served as a place of 
terror to colonized Africans who were bombarded with images of European superiority such as 
large sculptures immortalizing colonial conquerors.  Amutabi, Murunga and Otsio all depict the 8
colonized urban residents as victims, deprived of agency in contrast to the powerful colonial 
authorities.  
Historians such as Wright, Odile Georg and Fassil Demissie have written on the role 
colonial authorities played in shaping the political, cultural and socio-economic relations of 
 Gwendolyn Wright,The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 6
1991); Garth Myers, Verandahs of Power: Colonialism and Space in Urban Africa. Space, Place, and Society. 
(Syracuse University Press, 2003.); Kai K. Gutschow, ‘Das Neue Afrika: Ernst May’s 1947 Kampala Plan as Culture 
Programme’ in Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa: Intertwined and Contested Histories. ed. Fassil. 
Demissie (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012),373-406. 
 Kefa Otiso, ‘Colonial Urbanization and Urban Management in Kenya’ in African Urban Spaces in Historical 7
Perspective. ed by Toyin Falola and Steven J. Salm (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2005),
73-97; Godwin Murunga, “‘Inherently Unhygienic Races’: Plague and the Origins of Settler Dominance in Nairobi, 
1899-1907” in African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective. ed by Toyin Falola and Steven J. Salm (Durham, 
North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2005),98-130. 
 Maurice N. Amutabi, ‘Buildings as Symbols and Metaphors of Cultural Hegemony: Interrogating Colonial 8
Buildings and Architecture in Kenya’s Urban Spaces’ in Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa. ed. Fassil. 
Demissie (Burlington:Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012), 325-346.
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colonial cities. The colonial city is recognized by historians as the seat of power from which 
colonial authorities ruled the entire colony. On the opposite side of the spectrum, colonized 
Africans are often depicted by historians as having little agency in influencing the dynamics of 
the colonial city and, consequently, the colony. Georg highlighted how colonial policies of 
segregation and racial discrimination rendered urban Africans as powerless victims.  Amutabi 9
further argued that the colonial city not only symbolized a site of oppression to urban Africans 
but as a source of oppression to all colonized Africans. 
 This thesis argues that the disenfranchised African quarters of the colonial city, were not 
only sites of great poverty and inequality but also sites of anti-colonial struggle. Although 
disenfranchised, Africans mobilized against racist urban policies and reclaimed the urban space 
as their own. Garth Myers has argued that the construction of shanty towns and informal housing 
by colonized Africans, served as grassroots efforts to defy colonial urban policies and decolonize 
the city. He observed that by creating these informal settlements, Africans redefined spaces in the 
colonial city as their own and provided their own means for survival in the absence of provisions 
from colonial governments.  According to Maurice Vambe, African residents in black 10
designated townships took ownership of colonial space, appropriated colonial intentions for 
urban space and placed their own African markings on the space. He argued that African 
migrants revealed their agency by developing cultural expressions of resistance in the townships. 
Vambe highlights, for example, the Jerusarema dance as an important symbol of African 
 Odile Georg, “From Hill Station (Freetown) to Downtown Conakry (First Ward): Comparing French and British 9
Approaches to Segregation  in Colonial Cities at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century. Canadian Journal of 
African Studies 32, no.1 (1998): 5.
 Garth Myers. "Postcolonial Cities." In African Cities: Alternative Visions of Urban Theory and Practice.(London: 10
Zed Books, 2011), 59.
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resistance in the Rhodesian urban space.  This thesis will demonstrate that African urban 11
dwellers acted as political agents in colonial and postcolonial cities. 
During the period of colonialism, African cities did not all have the same origins but bore 
similar qualities. Some cities such as Ibadan, Jenne, Mombasa and Cairo already existed as large 
thriving cities of trade prior to colonial rule.  Other African cities such as Nairobi of the Kenya 12
colony and Lusaka of Northern Rhodesia were established by the European colonial powers.  13
The establishment of European colonial rule on the continent, officially formalized with the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-5 allowed colonial powers to change the dynamics of existing African 
cities or develop entirely new cities. In the instance of preexisting settlements, colonial powers 
often chose to either 1) merely occupy the existing precolonial city, 2) destroy the existing 
settlement and build a new city 3) create a ‘hybrid’ city by building around the existing 
settlement or building a separate city close to the existing settlement.  14
Historians commonly associated colonial plans of the urban spaces with colonialists’ 
political ideologies. Anthony D. King stressed that colonial cities often supported the main 
colonizing mission of the colonizer. Resource extraction was the main motivation for 
Maurice Taonezi Vambe, ‘“Aya Mahobo”: Migrant Labour and the Cultural Semiotics of Harare (Mbare) African 11
Township, 1930-70’ in Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa, ed. Fassil Demissie (Burlington:Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2012), 153-174.
 Urban planning scholar Myers describes the size of these pre-colonial cities as ‘comparable to many European 12
cities in size prior to the rise of European power.’ See Myers. Postcolonial Cities, 50.
 Amutabi, Buildings as Symbols and Metaphors of Colonial Hegemony, 327.13
 Lawrence J, Vale, Architecture, Power, And National Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 68 ; Bill 14
Freund, The African City: A History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 75, 101; Myers, Postcolonial 
cities, 50-1.
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colonization in most African colonies.  Thus, several colonial cities such as Accra (Ghana), Dar 15
es Salaam (Tanzania) and Lagos (Nigeria) were located on the coast to further facilitate overseas 
trade whilst other cities such as the copper towns of Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia) 
were located near resource sources to better facilitate extraction. Vittoria Capresi argued that the 
Italian mission to populate the colony of Libya with unemployed Italian nationals at the height of 
colonization heavily impacted the architecture of Libyan towns. According to Capresi, Libyan 
cities were thus designed to be extensions of the Italian homeland and symbols evoking fascist 
power.  On the other hand, Hassan Radoine linked the French colonial policy of fetishizing 16
Moroccan culture to the dual nature of Moroccan cities. Moroccan cities are characterized by 
two separate quarters: the precolonial walled quarter, the medina, and the French developed and 
inhabited quarter, Ville Nouvelle, built around the precolonial city. Radoine argued the French’s 
sought to stem the roots of resistance amongst the colonized by appealing to the cultural and 
architectural practices of the colonized peoples. Radoine further argued that the so-called 
preservation of the precolonial medina was actually an attempt by the French to prevent the 
colonized from being influenced by Western practices.   17
By the mid twentieth century, the European colonial powers lost most of their African 
colonies through the process of decolonization. In some violent struggles for liberation such as 
 Anthony D., King,  Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World-economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the 15
World Urban System (London: Routledge, 1990), 20-22 ; Myers, Postcolonial Cities, 51.
 Vittoria Capresi, ‘Architecture Transfer, Italian Colonial Architecture in Libya: “Libyan Rationalism” and the 16
Concept of Mediterraneity”, 1926-1942’ in Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa, ed. Fassil Demissie 
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012), 33-66.
 Hassan Radoine, ‘French Territory an Urbanism: General Lyautey and Architect Prost in Morocco (1912-1925)’ 17
in Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa, ed. Fassil Demissie (Burlington:Ashgate Publishing Company, 
2012), 11-32.
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the case of the colonies of Algeria, Mozambique and Kenya, and some peaceful processes such 
as the case of Tanganyika, Nigeria and Morocco, colonized Africans gained their independence 
from colonial powers. Colonial leaders were replaced with a new class of nationalist and highly 
educated African leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, many of whom were educated abroad in the metropole and returned 
to the colonies to lead the independence movements. What became of these former colonial 
African cities that were designed to promote European superiority? How did they evolve from 
the colonial period to the postcolonial period, and finally, how did postcolonial African leaders 
and urban planners overcome the challenges they inherited from colonialism? 
 Various methods were used by postcolonial leaders to decolonize the city. Bill Freund 
highlighted that certain African leaders decolonized cities by renaming them with Afrocentric 
and vernacular names. Mobuto sese Seko, president of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
renamed Leopoldville (which was named after the Belgian King Leopold) in 1966 to Kinshasa. 
Similarly, Salisbury of present-day Zimbabwe (formerly known as Rhodesia) was renamed 
Harare in 1982.  In her study on postcolonial Nairobi, Many monuments that were erected to 18
celebrate European imperialists were removed and replaced with monuments dedicated to 
African freedom fighters or emblems of national unity.  In a further attempt to decolonize the 19
African city, several postcolonial African leaders chose to abandon former colonial capital cities 
and create new national capitals altogether. For example, in 1983, President Félix Houphouët-
 Freund, The African City, 144, 146.18
 Laragh Larsen. ‘Re-Placing Imperial Landscapes: Colonial Monuments and the Transition to Independence in 19
Kenya,’  Journal of Historical Geography 38, no.1 (2012):45-56.
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Boigny transferred the Ivorian capital from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro whilst President Hastings 
Banda relocated Malawi’s capital from Blantyre to Lilongwe in 1975.  20
 African postcolonial leaders were instrumental in relocating African national capitals. 
Although, historians identify how the ideologies of colonialists influenced colonial cities, they 
rarely assess how the ideologies of the postcolonial leaders influenced urban plans. This thesis 
explores the impact of various postcolonial political regimes and ideologies on urban plans. To 
simplify the scope of analysis, only cities in former British colonial Africa will be studied. The 
capitals of Tanzania and Nigeria, Dodoma and Abuja, will be used as case studies of relocated, 
planned cities. Both countries were formerly colonized by the British with one country being 
located on the east of the continent and the other located on the west of the continent. The 
postcolonial political regimes of both countries differed greatly. From 1977 until 1992, Tanzania 
was ruled as a single-party state. At present, the same party, has ruled the country since 
Independence in 1962. On the other hand, Nigeria’s political history has been characterized by 
several coups, multiple regime changes ranging from civilian rule to military rule. Thus how 
would these different political histories influence the postcolonial urban space? 
 This thesis also seeks to study what new visions African postcolonial leaders had for the 
African city as opposed to those of the colonial leaders. As such the case studies of Abuja and 
Dodoma will be contrasted with that of colonial Nairobi. Like the postcolonial cities of Abuja 
and Dodoma, colonial Nairobi is also a relocated capital. The British colonials chose to relocate 
the capital of the East African Protectorate (later the Kenya colony and present day republic of 
 Leon Dash, “Vanity Capital is President’s Village” The Guardian (London) May 6. 1983; “Capital to Move” The 20
Globe and Mail (Toronto, Ontario) March 11, 1983. sec. Around the World; Myers, Verandahs of Power, 146.
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Kenya) from Mombasa to Nairobi albeit for different political reasons than the leaders of 
postcolonial Nigeria and Tanzania. Geographically, all three capital cities were relocated from 
coastal regions to the central hinterlands of the political territories: the capital of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria was relocated from the coastal colonial capital to the hinterlands of Abuja; 
Dodoma and Nairobi replaced coastal Dar es Salaam and Mombasa respectively; while, Nairobi, 
Dodoma and Abuja were developed on rural sites. 
 The chapters of the thesis will be broken down in the following manner: the first chapter 
provides a study of colonial Nairobi. It gives a brief history of colonial Nairobi, outlines the 
origins of the city and explores the political, cultural and socio-economic agenda the colonialists 
had for the city. This chapter will also evaluate how colonized Africans fit into colonial urban 
plans and identify the challenges faced by colonized Africans in colonial Nairobi. Ultimately, I 
demonstrate how colonized Africans sought to decolonize Nairobi from within, tracing the anti-
colonial resistance until Kenya’s Independence in 1963. 
 The second chapter studies efforts to decolonize the Tanzanian city through the 
establishment of Dodoma. Picking up where chapter one left off, chapter two begins by 
identifying the challenges that face Dar es Salaam in the new era. Essentially, it explores in great 
detail why the postcolonial government chose to relocate the capital city from Dar es Salaam to 
Dodoma. In this chapter, I demonstrate how the ideology of the country’s first postcolonial 
leader, Julius Nyerere impacted Tanzanian urban space. Historians commonly note the failures of 
Nyerere’s ideology of African socialism particularly as it pertained to Tanzanian rural areas. 
Little, however, has been written on how the ideology translated to the urban space. In my work, 
I provide a careful evaluation of how Nyerere’s ideology impacted upon Dodoma. 
 9
 The final chapter is a study of the relocated, planned capital of Abuja. It begins by 
illuminating why the transfer of the Nigerian Federal capital to Abuja took place. Unlike Kenya 
or Tanzania, Nigeria did not have a significant white settler population. Therefore, the colonial 
legacies in Lagos differ from those in Nairobi or Dar es Salaam.  
 This chapter also explores the main political motivations of the Nigerian government to 
transfer the capital and how these motivations impacted upon the urban plans of Abuja. Going a 
step further than the Dodoma chapter, this chapter will also trace the progress of the construction 
of Abuja up to the present. It will also evaluate the extent to which the urban plans of Abuja were 
physically realized and thus addressed urban challenges rooted in imperial times.  
 10
CHAPTER I.  
Nairobi: Creating a White-only Metropolis in Colonial Kenya 
 11
The 1950 film Nairobi, produced by the British colonial government, celebrated the so-called 
development and progress that colonial rule brought to African people. The British commentator 
in the film contrasted scenes of Maasai cattle herders in rural Kenya with the “great African 
metropolis” of Nairobi and its “modern colonial architecture.” The film further emphasized 'the 
great blocks of flats and huge hotels standing where once the skin huts of Maasai herdsmen stood 
and motor cars parked where once the cattle rode”.  Notably absent from the film are the voices 21
and experiences of the Africans who resided in Nairobi. The film does not portray the oppressive 
nature of the city on its colonized people. Nor does it examine the city as the backbone of the 
colonial economy, highly militarized and the seat from which the imperial power dominated the 
wider colony.  More significantly, the film depicted neither the agency of African urban 22
residents nor their resistance to imperial forces. 
Origins of the Colonial City 
 Initially established as a rest and supply depot for railway workers, Nairobi was created 
by the British Colonial Government in 1899 during the construction of the Ugandan Railway 
from coastal Mombasa to Kisumu.  Prior to British settlement, the Nairobi area was a swampy 23
space, mainly inhabited by the Maasai and Kikuyu cattle herders. Upon the British occupation of 
 The Colonial Film Project provides an online archive of colonial films that illustrate life in British colonies. See 21
Nairobi. Kenya: Colonial Film Unit, 1950. Film. http://www.colonialfilm.org.uk/node/1698; Day in Nairobi. Kenya: 
Colonial Film Unit, 1955. Film.
 Thomas Spear, “‘A Town of Strangers’ or ‘A Model Modern East African Town’”  in David Anderson and 22
Richard Rathbone, Africa’s Urban Past (Oxford & Portsmouth, NH: James Currey & Heinemann, 2000), 199.
 Garth Myers, Verandahs of Power, (Syracuse University Press, 2003), 33.23
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Nairobi, the Maasai and Kikuyu were subsequently displaced. The British named Nairobi after 
the Masai name for the river in the area, Ewaso Nairobi translated as “stream of cool water.”   24
 The British saw Nairobi as a “natural capital” for a number of geographical, political and 
economic reasons, therefore they decided to transfer the capital of the British East Africa 
Protectorate (later known as the Kenya Colony in 1921) from Mombasa to Nairobi in 1905.  In 25
order to provide administrative and commercial support to white settler farmers in the agrarian 
hinterlands, the British Colonial Government chose to transfer the colonial capital from the 
coastal city of Mombasa to Nairobi in the agrarian hinterlands.  This move was in accordance 26
with the colonial agricultural policy which emphasized the establishment of large white-owned 
plantations to defray the costs of the railway. The colonial government pursued a white 
supremacist policy of creating a “white man’s country” in which only white European settlers 
would inhabit and profit from the Protectorate.  The decision to transfer the capital from 27
Mombasa to Nairobi was also spurred a desire by the colonial government to closely monitor and 
control the African populations of the colony from a central and thus more strategic part of the 
country. In a 1904 article in the colonial newspaper East African Standard, colonial authorities 
rationalized their choice of Nairobi as the administrative capital:  
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Nairobi is the centre from which all action will come in case of any trouble with the 
native races—and few new countries have been settled and civilized without such 
troubles — for it is between Nairobi and the Lake that any possible rising can occur.  28
Unlike the humid, tropical and coastal climate of Mombasa, the Nairobi climate was one “in 
which a white man could live.”  Further away from the coast, Nairobi’s climate was less humid 29
and hot with fewer mosquitos than Mombasa. The new capital thus proved to be more conducive 
to European temperament and health than Mombasa. Thus, the British transferred the capital to 
cater to European health concerns, to monitor African populations and support White farmers.  
 The transfer of the capital to Nairobi was a gradual one. In 1919 Nairobi’s municipal 
government was established and key Government buildings were erected in 1922, most notably 
the Government House. In 1926, an urban plan for Nairobi, which outlined the various quarters 
of the city, was drawn up by Baker and Walter Jameson. On March 30th 1950, Nairobi was 
recognized and given the title of city by the Duke of Gloucester. 
Colonial Visions of the City 
 British colonialists intended to use Nairobi to tame the presumably wild colonial territory. 
This vision was outlined by Eric Dutton, Britain’s colonial clerk and secretary. In February 1926 
while passing through Nairobi, Dutton outlined his vision for Nairobi. He expressed a strong 
desire to bring structure and order to the colonial urban space: 
 A town plan ambitious enough to turn Nairobi into a thing of beauty has been slowly 
worked out, and much has already been done. But until that plan has borne fruit Nairobi 
  “Nairobi — The Natural Capital” The East African Standard, August 13, 1904.28
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must remain what she was then, a slatternly creature, unfit to queen it over so lovely a 
country.  30
  
Dutton used highly gendered language to outline his proposal. He likened (pre-colonial) Nairobi 
to an unrefined, unkempt, undignified woman in great need of direction and training. Such 
training would come from the masculine and noble colonial authorities. This language was 
evocative of the colonialists’ desire to steer and expose undignified colonized people to so-called 
refined Western civilization and culture. Dutton also went on to oversee the development of the 
cities of Zanzibar, and Lusaka.   31
 The development of Nairobi was presumed to be the beginning of the wider colony’s 
civilization. Elspeth Huxley, a colonial writer, a devout fan of British Imperialism and self-
described ‘authority on the Kenya Colony,’ regularly wrote about the progress brought by the 
British through the development of Nairobi. In a 1950 newspaper article on Nairobi, Huxley 
celebrated the so-called civilization and order that white settlers brought to Kenya:  
Fifty years ago, Nairobi was a railway construction camp beside a swampy stream where 
Masai warriors drove their cattle to drink. Lions roared there every night and game 
grazed the plains all round in fantastic profusion. Two strips of steel destroyed this savage 
Eden: the tracks of the Uganda Railway, built to link the east coast of Africa with the 
sources of the Nile.  32
Notably absent from Huxley’s narrative are the voices of Africans, whom she effectively 
excluded. Kenyan historian Maurice Amutabi, equated this erasure with the exclusion of Africans 
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from the urban space, which made white Europeans the presumed residents of the urban space.  33
In her  1935 biography on the earliest white settler in the Kenya colony, Lord Delamere, Huxley 
presented Africans as the antithesis to white settlers who she praised as bringing development 
and civilization to the city:  
The land to which Delamere came was…wholly primitive. Its scattered peoples, grouped 
into separate and mutually hostile tribes, were pagan, frequently nomadic, ignorant of 
the outside world and such simple devices as the plough, the wheel, the pump, the loom, 
the coin; they had evolved no alphabet, built no cities, made no roads; their tool was the 
digging stick, their dress their skin, their weapon the spear…Europeans were civilized, 
Africans were not.  34
  
In the above quote, Huxley implied Africans were backward, naive, and barbaric peoples as 
contrasted with European settlers who were presumed to be sophisticated, intellectually superior 
and the natural redeemers of the “primitive” African race. 
 Colonial authorities sought to replicate the cities and towns of the metropole in the 
colonial city of Nairobi to cater to the comforts of white settlers. In his 1929 memoir, Dutton 
outlined his desire for a European town within Nairobi:  
There may one day arise a citizen who will proclaim to the world his pride in Nairobi. It 
is possible. Maybe one day Nairobi will be laid out with tarred roads, with avenues of 
flowering trees, flanked by noble spaces and stately squares; a cathedral worthy of faith 
and country; museums and galleries of art, theaters and public offices.  35
Certain colonial establishments were modeled after those in Europe. This is nowhere more clear 
than in the 1904 plan for the five star hotel in Nairobi that was intended to be “conducted by 
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Europeans for white people in the style they have been accustomed to at their homes.”  It was 36
intended to be staffed solely by white Europeans. It was anticipated that when the hotel was 
opened at the end of 1904, “there will be a white woman cook; in fact all the help inside will be 
white, including a white bartender.’  By creating Western-style hotels and other establishments, 37
the British sought to recreate the comforts of home in Nairobi. 
 As the seat of administration for the entire Kenya colony, Nairobi was also intended to be 
a fitting symbol of British hegemony. Scholars have argued that the prevalence of European 
architecture and the erection of colonial monuments within the colonial city served to symbolize, 
commemorate and consolidate colonial power.  Ikem Okoye argues that the dominant use of 38
European style architecture in the colonial cities by colonizers at the expense of traditional 
African architecture attempted to highlight the superiority of European power, “the new civility 
in all its propriety.”  Herbert Baker, the celebrated architect who designed several iconic 39
colonial buildings across the British Empire, strongly believed that colonial architecture needed 
to reflect the strength of the British empire.   40
 In commemorating British imperialism through urban design, colonial planners intended 
to symbolically dominate the space and intimidate the colonized populations. Baker subscribed 
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to the urban principles of the influential British colonialist, Lord Lugard, who declared in 1893 
that the colonial officer’s “dwelling house should be as superior to those of the native as he is 
himself superior to them.”  In this way, Baker’s design for the Nairobi Government House (now 41
the Senate House and residence of the President of the Republic of Kenya) was neoclassical 
featuring Roman and Greek architectural traditions such as pillars, in a bid to liken the British 
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Figure 1.1 Nairobi Government House building designed by Herbert Baker, 1938, Matson 
(G. Eric and Edith) Photograph Collection, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 
Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA)
Empire with the great ancient Empires.  Moreover, Baker positioned the Government House on 42
the highest point of the city, on top of Nairobi Hill, to dominate the city’s landscape and further 
symbolize the power of the Governor of the Colony who resided in the house.  
 Thomas Metcalfe argued that “Baker’s architectural ideals spanned, as they were meant 
to join together, a far flung empire that would forever secure Britain’s position in the world.”  43
Baker’s key colonial buildings such as the Viceroy’s Palace in New Delhi and the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria bore similar features to the Nairobi Government House, as they too were 
designed in the neoclassical tradition and were all perched on the central hill of the respective 
cities.  In his vision for the Union buildings, Baker highlighted the imposing role the building 44
was to have on the African population. There were to be “small partly open Council Place for 
Native Indabas [meetings], where, without coming into the Building, Natives may feel the 
majesty of the Government.”  To Baker, the colonial city was an essential tool for celebrating 45
and consolidating British hegemony. He acknowledged and praised Dutton’s vision of the 
colonial urban space which he described as: “understanding and sympathetic in all things 
pertaining to architecture in its widest implications as affecting the establishment our civilization 
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in the new, untamed countries.”  Through architecture, imperialists sought to effectively 46
symbolize European hegemony. 
 By naming Nairobi’s streets after influential colonial figures, colonial authorities also 
reinforced colonial rule. The main street in Nairobi was named Delamere Road after Lord 
Delamere, an early British settler, whilst the largest street in Nairobi was named Hardinge Street 
after the colony’s first Governor. Several streets in Nairobi were also named after members of the 
British Royal Family such as Princess Elizabeth Way, named for the current British monarch 
Queen Elizabeth II.  The erection of monuments of imperial figures such as Queen Victoria and 47
King George V served to further assert colonial power in the African colonial cities.  Thus, the 48
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Figure 1.2 The removal of the King George V Statue from Nairobi, Kenya 
(1964) (source East African Standard archives)
prevalence of monuments commemorating European figures, western style architecture and key 
colonial buildings on the urban landscape served to re-enforce European dominance.  
Racial Segregation in the City 
 The British colonial government pursued a strict policy of racial segregation in Nairobi. 
Colonial planners designed cities where the residence quarters of Europeans were separated from 
the African colonized peoples. The spatial separation of races in colonial cities was based in part, 
on colonizers’ fears of diseases and epidemics they were likely to contract from the native 
populations. A 1908 report addressed to the H. M. Secretary of State for the Colonies on the 
sanitary conditions of Nairobi, described Nairobi as “hopelessly unsanitary” with poor drainage 
systems, concluding that the health of Europeans was of utmost concern in comparison to the 
other races represented in Nairobi. “The site of Nairobi was a hopelessly unsanitary one that 
even if it were to late to move the railway town and the Indians it might still be advisable and 
even necessary, to remove the European inhabitants to some site on the neighboring hills.”  In 49
1911 the British Colonial Office medical advisory committee concluded that ‘it has been proved 
that the separation of the European from the natives is one of the most efficient means of 
protection against disease endemic amongst native races.’   50
 The colonial policy of segregation solely benefited the white population. In 1930, the  
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Public Health Act divided Nairobi into European, Indian and African quarters.  European 51
settlers were awarded the choicest plots of land and access to the city’s finest facilities. In 
western Nairobi, whites exclusively enjoyed prime real estate, the choicest hotels such as the 
Norfolk, the highest quality schools such as the Prince of Wales school, recreational spaces 
including parks, and various places of worship such as the Dutch Reformed Church, the Anglican 
Church, All Saints Cathedral and the Catholic Church the Holy Family Basilica and the 
Presbyterian church, St Andrews Church.  52
 In colonial Nairobi, racial segregation was not only restricted to separating white 
Europeans from Africans but also separating whites from the “highest class Indians.”  The 53
British brought Indian population to East Africa as indentured servants to work on the 
construction of the Ugandan railway. After the railway was completed, many Indians remained in 
the Kenya colony.  Prohibited from owning land in the rural areas, they settled in Nairobi and 54
dominated the city’s commercial industry.  The earliest commercial ventures in Nairobi have 55
been attributed to the Indians who established a bazaar in 1900. Although they were not at the 
top of the racial hierarchy, Asians were afforded certain municipal benefits such as representation 
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on the Municipal council, the right to vote in municipal elections and the right to own land.  56
Europeans, however, still dominated. Indians owned several properties in the Central Business 
District and the Asian and African districts. Still, British colonialists maintained negative 
sentiments toward the Indian population.  
 Colonial leaders and white-settlers regularly expressed their distaste for the Indian 
population. In 1923, in a letter to then Governor of Kenya, Governor Croydon, Dutton expressed 
a desire to have a strict spatial separation of Indians from the white residents of the city: “I 
believe nobody wants an Indian to come and live next to him….If we can prevent an Indian from 
living next to us, without treating him with injustice, then we should do it.”  The resentment 57
towards the Asian population was not heed only by the top colonial officials but also members of 
the general white settler population. In a letter to the Editor of The African Standard by a white 
Settler, Thomas A. Wood, justified segregation as a means of managing white racism towards the 
Indian population:  
…there is plenty of land available for the Indian, eminently suitable for him, in other 
parts, where he can associate with people of his own color, habits, and religion, which is 
much the happier arrangement than having him rubbing shoulders with a different race 
of people who don’t particularly enjoy his proximity…The Indian must be reasonable—
not expect to take possession of this country in its entirety, which would probably be the 
result were he allowed to settle anywhere and everywhere, and the best way to prevent 
the ebullition of hatred and contempt, quoted by your correspondent as occurring in 
other British Colonies, is to continue following the very wise plan of locating peoples of 
different race, habits, &c., in different sections of the country.  58
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White settlers were threatened by the Indian population who through their multiple commercial 
ventures, properties and political rights had the potential to undermine white supremacy.  
  Colonial authorities were arguably harshest towards the African population. In 1922, the 
Vagrancy Act was introduced to monitor and control the movement and presence of Africans in 
the colony, particularly in the city.  African men from the age of 16 years and above were 59
required to wear an identity card, Kipande, and work authorization documents around their neck. 
At any moment they might be stopped by any white man requesting to examine their Kipande.  60
Any African who had no legitimate cause to be in the city, was not employed by a white Settler, 
or deemed a squatter was immediately ejected from the city.  To further limit the African 61
presence in the city, families of African laborers were restricted from residing in the city. This 
resulted in an extremely high proportion of African adult men residing in colonial Nairobi with 
very few African women and children urban residents.   62
 The British colonialists envisioned Nairobi as a city solely for white occupation. The 
British colonial government intended that the indigenous African populations would remain in 
the rural areas to provide labor to white-owned plantations. The British promoted white-owned 
plantations, and gave white settlers the choicest and fertile land. Multitudes of Africans were 
 Kinuthia Macuria, “Slum Clearance and the Informal Economy in Nairobi.” Journal of Modern African Studies 59
30, no. 2 (1992), 221.
 Amutabi, Buildings as Symbols and Metaphors of Colonial Hegemony: Interrogating Colonial Buildings and 60
Architecture in Kenya’s Urban Space, 326.  
 Frederick Cooper, Struggle for the City: Migrant Labor, Capital, and the State in Urban Africa, (Beverley Hills: 61
Sage, 1983), 7. 
 Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, “Residential Segregation in African Cities,” In Urbanization and African 62
Cultures, ed.  Toyin Falola and Steven J. Salm, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2005), 349.
 24
forced off their land into small ethnic reserves, allocated to each identified African ethnic group. 
The white minority population received the vast percentage of the land whilst the Africans were 
forced to live in overpopulated and often low quality land reserves.  For example, the land 63
reserves allocated to the Meru and Embu were arid and plagued with tsetse flies. Timothy 
Parsons argues that the African land reserves mainly served as labour reserves to support a white-
dominated economy.   64
 The lack of viable agricultural opportunities and healthy living conditions in the rural 
areas drove many Africans to Nairobi. The colonial government restricted many African from 
owning or developing land for commercial farming. The emphasis on tribal homelands by the 
colonial state discouraged private ownership of land by African individuals. Rather, it promoted 
collective ownership of land. Furthermore, increased population growth on these reserves created 
great competition over resources which heightened social tensions, and further compromised an 
African individual’s ability to profit from private land ownership.  To complicate matters 65
further, Africans who sought to obtain private land in the less crowded reserves of another 
“tribe” not only were greatly restricted but often had to forsake their ethnic identity and 
allegiances in order to be adopted by this new ethnic group.  It is thus no surprise that thousands 66
of dispossessed and landless Africans ventured from the rural areas into Nairobi in hopes of 
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better economic prospects and to seek wage labor. The need for African labor in Nairobi also 
made it impossible for a city solely for white inhabitants to be established.  In the 1920s, with 67
the end of World War I and a construction boom, there was a huge demand for cheap labor in 
Nairobi. Colonized Africans formed the bulk of that labor force.  68
 One of the major challenges faced by Africans in city of Nairobi was the lack of housing. 
Nairobi rarely provided social services, neighborhoods or even housing for the growing black 
population. In a 1942 report on housing in Nairobi, a colonial officer, admitted housing was not 
even considered for Africans in the initial plan for Nairobi.  Housing for Africans, which was 69
mainly provided by the private sector, was really perceived as an afterthought. Such housing was 
limited, expensive and poor in quality. In 1943, a government inspector described the housing 
available to Africans as “appalling sub-human dwellings,” whilst a newspaper article described 
the houses as “old pieces of corrugated iron and discarded oil drums.”  Indeed, as a city 70
intended for and administered to promote white inhabitation Nairobi was a hostile environment 
for colonized Africans. 
The African in Nairobi: Challenging Colonial Visions of the City 
 Freund, The African City, 68.67
 White, Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi, 5.68
 Letter. British East Africa Protectorate to British Colonial Office. 1942 folder Nairobi Housing Scheme 1942/3, 69
Records of the Colonial Office, Commonwealth and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, Empire Marketing Board, 
and related bodies relating to the administration of Britain's colonies, 533/528/18. The British National Archives, 
Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
 Letter. Sir Cosmo Parkinson to Sir Arthur Dawe Dated 20th July, 1943. Folder Nairobi Housing Scheme, 70
1942/1943;  Slum Labour,” East African Standard, 29 July 1943.
 26
Penetrate the white front a little deeper, and you will quickly find the none too pleasant 
evidence of an Africa which has tried to keep pace with the towering white buildings. 
Here, behind the big departmental stores, are the slums and bazaars - but mainly the 
slums. They are a constant reminder that, although much have been accomplished in 50 
years, centuries of hard labour will be needed to adjust the temperamental balance 
between the old Africa and the new.” -  J. K. Holroyd, “A Landmark in Kenya’s History: 
When Nairobi Becomes a City” Yorkshire Post, 12 January 1950 
 In the above 1950 newspaper article on colonial Nairobi, the journalist J. K. Holroyd 
confronted the overwhelming presence of the slums. According to Holroyd, the slums appeared 
to be in direct opposition to the layout, design and order of the colonial city. In a city that ignored 
their presence, Africans carved their own space by establishing slums on the periphery of 
Nairobi. These informal settlements, with no municipal control, posed a threat to colonial 
authority. Colonial officers were deeply suspicious of the slums and deemed them “breeding 
grounds of discontent and of future troubles.”  Despite several attempts by the municipal 71
government to destroy the slums, they still remained.  Unable to stop their rise, in 1919, the 72
municipal government identified Pumwani district as the first African housing scheme. There, 
Africans were legally allowed to build their houses in the Pumwani district which was later 
followed by other African housing schemes.  73
 Africans also found means to defy colonial social policies. Despite restrictions preventing 
African families from residing in Nairobi, several African women still managed to reside in the 
city and prostitution was rife amongst Nairobi’s African neighborhoods. In her book on 
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prostitution in colonial Nairobi, The Comforts of Home, Luise White explores the different kind 
of prostitution that arose in African neighborhoods as a result of the housing and labour 
conditions on the African population. One such form was malaya prostitution in which a 
prostitute owned her own room and offered domestic services to patrons in addition to sexual 
services.  The domestic arrangements between malaya prostitutes and African male workers 74
was a subtle act of defiance against colonial authorities. In a setting that discouraged the 
presence of African women and families, these domestic unions still managed to occur between 
malaya prostitutes and their African clientele. Moreover, malaya prostitutes owned their property 
in a white dominated city.  
 Africans actively resisted colonial policies by mobilizing in labor strikes and seeking 
improved living conditions. In 1939, the housing crisis reached a crescendo as Africans struck 
over the high cost of rent and poor living conditions. The Kenyan Governor, Sir Henry Robert 
Brooke-Popham, outlined the grievances of the African uprising in a letter to Malcolm 
MacDonald, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Member of Parliament:  
The present position regarding native housing in Nairobi is undoubtedly serious. The 
demand for houses greatly exceeds the supply, with the result that considerable numbers 
of private native lodging house keepers are able to demand rentals which are beyond the 
capacity of the average native to pay without hardship. This profiteering has led to 
considerable native unrest which has manifested itself recently in a series of native strikes 
which, in the opinion of Principal Labour Officer, arose largely by reason of the high 
rents prevailing.  75
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The 1939 labour strike resulted in a response from the colonial authorities. Several colonial 
officers began to recognize the connection between the housing crisis for Africans and the 
precarious nature of African labour. The housing available to African populations was expensive 
and yet Africans were only employed as casual labor and paid low, pitiful wages. In 1939, 
colonial officer J. L. Keith blamed the hiring practices of whites for the Nairobi housing crisis, 
accusing white employers for hiring unskilled African laborers. According to Keith, African 
labor in Nairobi was highly unpredictable as such employees were easily fired and replaced 
which produced an unnecessarily large pool of labor and consequent overcrowding.   76
 In fear of another African uprising, the British colonial government made efforts to 
respond to the housing crisis. One such response was to further restrict the influx of African 
labor into the city. In 1939, Secretary of State to the Colonies Malcolm MacDonald proposed 
that some Africans be returned to the native reserves to reduce pressure on housing.  This 77
however, proved impossible. Other colonial officials called for a curb on the rent of private 
housing for Africans. In this way, colonial authorities shifted blame to private landlords who they 
accused of hiking up rent for Africans. In a 1939 report on housing Nairobi, colonial officer, 
Major G.H. Orde Brown acknowledged the colonial government’s failure to monitor the housing 
industry and the high rents charged by private landlords: 
There seems to be no indication of legislation to supplement the effect of municipal 
building; there appears to be a conspicuous need for better regulation of overbuilding and 
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rackrenting by private owners. The corporation housing can be used to set a standard, but 
some means for compelling the private landlord to come into line are essential?   78
As the quote implies, private landlords exploited housing shortages for Africans by charging 
exorbitant rents. Indeed, housing market for Africans was highly exploitative. 
 Prior to the labor strike of 1939, municipal housing for Africans was generally 
overlooked altogether by the colonial government. In 1942, a British colonial officer in the East 
African Protectorate admitted that, prior to African labor strikes, municipal housing for Africans 
in Nairobi was not considered an issue.  The Nairobi Municipal Authorities constructed housing 79
to accommodate African casual labor. Most of the plans featured barrack or dormitory style 
housing consisting of single room quarters with communal kitchens, bathrooms and latrines. This 
style of housing was suited for single male workers rather than families. There were also plans 
for recreational facilities for the Africans such as football pitches and a recreational hall in which 
“Africans [could] play billiards, pingpong, darts etc.. and dances are held.”  In addition, training 80
centers, vocational centers and night schools were also planned to alleviate the shortage of 
skilled African labour.  81
 The housing constructed by the colonial authorities failed to mitigate the shortage of 
housing for the African population. The colonial government identified several problems in their 
attempt to provide housing for Africans in the city, namely a shortage of building materials, 
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limited finances and skilled labour to construct the housing.  One colonial officer remarking on 
the difficult task of providing quality housing for African urban residents, concluded that “it is at 
present impossible to provide accommodation which will meet with municipal health 
requirements at an economical rental within the means of the average worker.”  He further 82
concluded that the surplus of African labour in Nairobi made the rise of shanty towns inevitable. 
The shanty towns would simple “serve as African quarters to European towns.”  Recognizing 83
their inability to provide sufficient housing for the African population, the Nairobi municipal 
authorities saw Shanty towns as an additional housing source for the African populations: “[t]he 
alternative to municipal housing schemes is to allow ‘African towns’ to be built by the Africans 
themselves outside the municipal control.”  Employment for African laborers was often 84
unpredictable. They could be ejected from the city at any point. It was, thus, not feasible to 
require Africans to provide their own accommodation. 
 The increased neglect, disenfranchisement and dispossession of Africans and the lack of 
funds or willingness on the part of the colonial government to consider rights for Africans, 
ultimately resulted in more African uprisings. The largest and most violent uprising in colonial 
Nairobi was the Mau Mau Emergency of 1952-60.The Secretary to the colonial War Council 
identified increasingly poor socioeconomic conditions as the source of the rebellion.  Several 85
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Africans joined the armed struggle of the Mau Mau in an attempt to regain their land. 
Accordingly, numerous demoralized Kikuyu, Embu and Meru took an oath and committed 
themselves to join the African-led militia, self-labelled as the “Kenya Land Freedom Army.”  86
The Kenya Land Freedom Army promised ‘ithaka na wiathi’ which is translated as ‘land and 
freedom.’   87
 The Mau Mau uprising soon spread from the countryside to the city. From 1952 to 1960, 
the African rebels waged a violent battle of resistance against colonial authorities. In 1954, the 
British colonial authorities engaged in Operation Anvil, a brutal and violent suppression of rebels 
in Nairobi. Nairobi was deemed the support base of the rebellion and the financial source for the 
rebels. Thus, the colonial government attempted to clear out the city of all Kikuyus and rebels. 
50,000 suspected Mau Mau were forcefully removed from Nairobi. Some were transferred to 
concentration camps whilst others were transferred to reserves.  Historians commonly recognize 88
the brutal torture and war crimes that were committed by the British against Mau Mau suspects 
and participants. Many African men were castrated, several African women were sexually 
assaulted and multitudes of Africans were killed.  89
 At a glance, it appeared that the armed resistance posed by the Mau Mau rebels was 
fruitless. In 1960, colonial authorities managed to win the Mau Mau war. However, the Mau Mau 
insurgency was not totally unsuccessful. Certain historians identify the Mau Mau Emergency, as 
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the ultimate catalyst for the decolonization movement. Hilda Nissimi argues that the Mau Mau 
Emergency was the turning point in which the British colonial power recognized their limits to 
colonial rule. She further argues that in continuing colonial rule, the British colonial Office used 
brutal force, committed more atrocities against the Africans and thereby angered the general 
British public in the metropole.  Other historians, such as Kefa Otsio, argue that the 90
mobilization and demonstrated nationalism of the Mau Mau fighters forced the British to 
accommodate itself to African demands for representation.  In January 1960, the first of the 91
three Lancaster House conferences occurred and thus began official negotiations for 
Independence.  On 12 December 1963, Kenya was declared Independent. 92
  
The British idealized Nairobi as a city solely for white-settlers. The urban plans, 
architecture, and administration of the city were all designed to support this vision of white 
supremacy. Colonized Africans were denied access to the city. Paradoxically, the need for 
manual and domestic labor prevented colonial authorities from shutting out Africans from the 
city. Additionally, the discriminatory colonial policies pursued in the rural areas drove many 
Africans to Nairobi. The colonial administration’s lack of consideration for Africans’ living 
conditions rendered Nairobi a site of great oppression to the Africans. Yet even in this hostile 
city, Africans gained ownership of the urban space and resisted colonial authorities. 
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CHAPTER II.  
Dodoma: Translating Ujamaa to the Postcolonial City 
 34
On the 9 December 1961, the British granted Independence to the colony of Tanganyika 
(now presently known as Tanzania) whose decolonization process has been attributed to a man of 
humble origins a teacher by profession affectionately referred to as Mwalimu (Swahili for 
teacher) by Tanzanians, Julius Kambarage Nyerere.  In 1954 whilst serving as a teacher, 93
Nyerere created the political party, The Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU), that 
spearheaded the Tanganyikan decolonization movement.. Nyerere is also recognized as Baba wa 
Taifa (the founding father of the nation) as he masterminded the integration of mainland 
Tanganyika with the islands Zanzibar and Pemba in April 1964 to form the nation state of 
Tanzania. He served as the first leader of the post-colonial Tanzania.  
 A self-proclaimed pan-Africanist and socialist, Nyerere is well known for his 
revolutionary ideology of Ujamaa (African socialism) that promoted the industrialization of rural 
areas, collectivization of farms and the unity of the global south. As such, Nyerere’s vision for 
the African capital city was often diametrical to colonial visions of the African city. One key 
development during Nyerere’s rule was the transfer of the Tanzanian capital city from Dar es 
Salaam to Dodoma in 1973. Tanzania’s former colonialists, the British, did not view Nyerere’s 
decision to relocate the capital favorably.  
 The British consulate officers described the new capital as “treeless” and “a bleak 
township baking in the arid central plateau.”  The British were of the opinion that it was more 94
efficient and economically viable for the capital to remain in Dar es Salaam, an already 
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developed city with heavy infrastructure, as opposed to Dodoma ‘a one-horse township in the 
centre of the most arid region of Tanzania.’  Furthermore, the British were convinced that the 95
decision to relocate the capital was Nyerere’s attempt to unravel modernity and progress in the 
name of decolonization. The plans for the new capital of Dodoma drew references to the Garden 
City Movement which will be further explored in the chapter. 
The Arusha Declaration: A framework for understanding Nyerere’s policy for urbanization 
 In the 1967 Arusha Declaration and TANU’s policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance, 
Julius Nyerere outlined the country’s commitment to becoming a socialist state. In this statement, 
In this statement, Nyerere emphasized his goal to create a socialist state of Tanzania and its 
significance to the people of Tanzania. In his vision, a socialist state was “one in which all people 
are workers and neither capitalism nor feudalism exists.”  Nyerere’s  definition of socialism 96
stressed equality amongst all members of society and the “absence of exploitation” in Tanzanian 
society.  Transcribing these principles of socialism to Nyerere’s vision for the city, one can 97
conclude that Nyerere idealized a Tanzanian city that was absent of capitalist and feudalist forces 
where everyone worked equally, were treated equally and had equal ownership of factors of 
production. 
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 In this Declaration, Nyerere envisioned the overcoming of colonial legacies of 
oppression, exploitation and poverty through Tanzanian self-reliance. He also identified 
challenges to past frameworks for development. According to Nyerere, the emphasis on money 
as a means to Tanzania’s development by previous Tanzanian development models was utterly 
flawed and posed a threat to the Tanzanian State. Since Tanzania was already a relatively poor 
country, Nyerere argued financing development  proved  impossible as one could not increase the 
taxes of already burdened tax payers: ‘We realize that the cow has no more milk - that is, that the 
people find it difficult to pay more taxes.’  Thus  Nyerere saw collective work as the way out for 98
a country that had no access to development funds. 
 Nyerere then critiqued external aid as an alternative source to Tanzanian development. He 
argued that seeking external aid in the forms of gifts, loans and foreign direct investment was not 
a realistic means to development. He argued that external aid would not be sufficient to make 
Tanzania a prosperous nation. He further opined that in the instance external aid was able to meet 
Tanzania’s development need, it would ultimately undermine Tanzanian self-reliance: 
‘Independence means self-reliance. Independence cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts 
and loans from another for its development.’  Furthermore, Nyerere argued that any loan 99
received from foreign countries would only serve as a burden to the Tanzanian people who 
already had little means to repay any loan. Finally, Nyerere concluded that external aid, 
particularly foreign direct investment, compromised African socialism as profits would not  be 




 Industrialization and urbanization were also major themes in the Arusha Declaration. 
Nyerere opined that the conflation of industrialization and development was detrimental to the 
cause of African socialism. Firstly, he argued that industrialization was unrealistic for Tanzania 
as the country was neither able to finance such heavy capital nor did Tanzania possess the 
necessary expertise. It is important to note that Nyerere’s negative views on industrialization are 
in accord with the economic thinker, E. F. Schumacher, a German development theorist who 
believed that developing countries would achieve development by improving human capital and 
through modest agricultural centered development policies as opposed to the large-scale 
industrial policies pursued by the West. Schumacher who visited Nyerere in Tanzania was 
regarded to have been an avid supporter of Nyerere’s Arusha Declaration.  Nyerere argued that 100
even if Tanzania procured the finances and expertise necessary for industrialization such an 
action undermined Tanzania’s path towards self-reliance and socialism. Dependency on foreign 
capital solely reduced Tanzania’s agency to develop herself. Furthermore the solicitation of 
expertise from foreign capitalists promoted capitalism over TANU’s vision of socialism. 
 Nyerere further argued that the emphasis on industrialization and consequently on 
urbanization negatively impacted the country’s path to socialism. According to Nyerere, the 
knowledge of a country’s limited finances influenced policy makers to industrialize cities and 
towns over rural villages. The trend of industrialization thus favored urban centers and left rural 
areas vastly underdeveloped. Nyerere contested that the rural farmers, through the toil of their 
labor financed urbanization and bore the financial burden of industrialization. He further argued 
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that such peasant farmers were exploited in the grand scale of things, and thus moved Tanzania 
farther away from the path of a truly socialist state: “If we are not careful we might get to the 
position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the 
peasants.”  Nyerere thus envisioned a city to be one that did not eclipse or exploit the rural 101
area. 
 Another recurring theme in the Arusha Declaration is that of agriculture. Nyerere 
presented agriculture as the sole means of developing Tanzania. Not only did he intend for 
Tanzanians to grow their own food he also saw them exporting surplus agricultural goods. He 
argued that Tanzania needed to make use of the vast resources,  it’s more than 362,00 square 
miles of fertile land and plentiful rain. Nyerere believed that by increasing agricultural capacity 
through efforts like collective farms, Tanzania would achieve prosperity and self-reliance. His 
vision for agriculture also translated into urban planning. The urban planners of the Tanzanian 
capital of Dodoma were commissioned to incorporate several pockets of agricultural land for 
residents to grow their own food.  
 The final apparent theme in the Arusha declaration was its emphasis on human capital. 
Nyerere opined that it was people rather than money that was the means of development for 
Tanzania. Like Schumacher, Nyerere argued development policies centered on improving human 
capital and well-being which was the solution to the country’s prosperity. As such, Nyerere urged 
every Tanzanians to adopt the human ethic of hard work and equally contribute to the collective 
effort of work. He argued that laziness and drunkenness would prove detrimental to Tanzania’s 
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growth. He noted: “nobody should be allowed to loiter in towns or villages without doing work 
which would enable him to be self-reliant without exploiting his relatives.’   102
 Nyerere warned against citizens who were not equally contributing to the country’s 
collective work effort arguing that they contributed to the country’s damnation: “…And for the 
defence of our nation, it is necessary for us to be on guard against internal stooges who could be 
used by external stooges who could be used by external enemies who aim to destroy us.”  It 103
was thus not uncommon for TANU to expel squatters, the unemployed, the underemployed and 
those employed in the informal sector who TANU deemed as lazy individuals from the streets of 
Dar es Salaam. Such campaigns were justified by TANU as the transferral of individuals from 
unproductive labor to more productive labor on rural farms.   104
 Nyerere also valued education. He persistently highlighted the importance of teaching 
Tanzanians the value and practice of self-reliance. He argued that educated workers would be 
more productive resulting in the greater prosperity of the nation. It is to no surprise that schools 
were the most common features in the urban plans of the city of Dodoma. Nyerere’s 
administration and its Five Year Plans have been lauded for increasing literacy rates in Tanzania. 
To achieve the principles of the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere identified four areas of focus (i) 
The Land and Agriculture, (ii) The People, (iii) The Policy of Socialism and Self-Reliance, and 
(iv) Good Leadership.  He argued that the sustainable use of Tanzanian land was key to 105
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successful rural and agricultural development. Furthermore, Nyerere believed that effective 
stewardship of land would enable Tanzanians to produce enough food as well as export cash 
crops for present and future generations to come.  He argued that hardworking and committed 106
people, policies of socialism and effective leaders were essential to Tanzania’s progress. 
Dar es Salaam and Nyerere: The Decision to Transfer the Tanzanian Capital City 
 Nyerere’s administration sought to create a classless capital city that would embody the 
principal of Ujamaa (brotherhood). As with most colonial cities, the city of Dar es Salaam was 
characterized by inequality and racial segregation. European settlers occupied the prized parts of 
the city, followed by Asians and then Africans who lived in the worst parts of the city. They were 
plagued by insufficient housing and services. Upon Independence, Nyerere was tasked with not 
only providing services and housing to those who were underserved by the colonial government 
but also to eliminate economic and racial inequality in a new socialist state. The Nyerere 
administration thus had the following to say about Dar es Salaam: “Dar es Salaam is a dominant 
focus of most development, the antithesis of what Tanzania is aiming for, and is growing at a 
pace, which, if not checked, will damage the city as a human habitat and Tanzania as an 
egalitarian socialist state.”   107
 The key visions of Nyerere’s economic plan as outlined in the Arusha declaration were 
related to rural development and national unity. Citing the unrivaled economic development 
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present in Dar es Salaam, the Nyerere administration  viewed Dar es Salaam as diametrically 
opposed to the vision of Ujamaa.  Garth Myers introduced the concept of the ‘primate city’ to 108
characterize the disproportionate development of most former colonial cities in comparison to 
other regions. In a primate city, Myers argued economic development was highly concentrated in 
the colonial city and non-existent in other regions of the country. Incentivized by protecting 
colonial trade interests, colonialists tended to develop and urbanize regions that were along 
major trade routes, namely the coastal regions, or near the source of valuable resources, as with 
the case of the city of Johannesburg which was located next to gold deposits.  Located on the 109
East African coast and one of the important connections on the British East African railway, the 
city of Dar es Salaam, not only served as the seat of colonial government but a convenient 
location from which colonialists could charter of the colonies resources to the metropole. It is no 
surprise that Dar es Salaam served as one of the largest commercial centers of British East 
Africa.   110
 Contrarily, Nyerere sought to spread development throughout the country by means of 
Ujamaa - agricultural development, rural industrialization and the implementation of collective 
farms. TANU deemed Dar es Salaam as isolated from the rest of the country with poor and 
unhealthy living conditions namely a ‘hot and humid climate and the prevalence of malaria’ and 
high congestion.  TANU thus sought to build a new capital city that was central to the country 111
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with plenty of space from which to facilitate the country’s economic growth. Dodoma, being 
centrally located in the rural hinterlands of Tanzania, “300 miles west of Dar-es-Salaam and 300 
miles from all of the edges [of the country]”, was integral to the policy of Ujamaa.  Nyerere’s 112
administration intended to use Dodoma as a seat from which to oversee and effectively control 
the implementation of Ujamaa and villagization. The planners thus framed Dodoma in 
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Figure 2.1 Location of Dodoma within Tanzania (Source Project Planning Associates)
accordance to Ujamaa and villagization:  “Dodoma is at the centre of Tanzania's Ujamaa village 
heartland. It is an appropriate setting for an Ujamaa capital, where the problems and progress of 
neighboring villages will be in daily evidence.”   113
 Dodoma Master Plan, 30.113
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Figure 2.2 Dodoma Proximity (Source Project Planning Associates)
 Nyerere and TANU also viewed Dar es Salaam as the moral abyss of Tanzania. TANU 
often presented rural residents, particularly village women, as model citizens whilst urban 
dwellers were depicted as morally bankrupt, corrupted by Western ideals and irresponsible 
citizens. According to Nyerere, village women were moral, upright and hardworking citizens 
whilst urban women and village men were the scum of Tanzanian society:  
Women who love in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania…the 
energies of thousands of women in the towns which are at present wasted in gossip, 
dancing and drinking, are a great treasure which could contribute more towards the 
development of our country than anything we could get from rich nations. We would be 
doing something very beneficial to our country if we went to the villages and told our 
people that they hold this treasure and that is up to them to use it for their own benefit 
and the benefit of our whole nation.  114
Shortly after Tanzanian Independence, TANU pursued a national cultural policy that promoted a 
rural and traditional lifestyle as authentically African and Tanzanian. On the other side, TANU 
scorned the transnational culture and trends adored by many of Dar es Salaam’s youth. 
Consequently, the TANU Youth League (TYL) launched a series of bans on what the party 
considered as perverse Western clothing and music. Operation Vijana (translated from Swahili as 
Operation youth) was launched in October 1968 as a ban on “miniskirts, wigs, women’s bleaches 
[skin lightening creams], and tight male trousers” with the purpose of “defending Tanzania’s 
culture and furthering the aims of the Arusha Declaration.”  The TYL set up bands of mainly 115
male members to enforce their campaign against public indecency in the streets of Dar es Salaam 
and young victims often faced the brunt of the attacks. Shortly after on November 12, 1969, soul 
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music was “banned from being played” by the coast regional commissioner, Mustafa 
Songambele, who felt the music was corrupting Tanzanian youth.  116
  Nyerere and TANU made implicit assumptions not only about the culture of Tanzanian 
people but also collectively about the nature of Tanzanian people. TANU argued that Tanzanian 
people were authentically a rural people who were more accustomed to an agrarian lifestyle than 
an urban one: “Traditionally, the Tanzanian people relate to small communities and wide rural 
areas; a dense urban environment is in many ways alien to the national lifestyles and 
philosophies.”  The above statement made by TANU above was also in accordance with the 117
emphasis Nyerere placed on agriculture  in the Arusha declaration. One, however, notes the irony 
of the TANU rhetoric in painting Tanzanians as non-urban dwellers but rural dwellers. Mamood 
Mahmdani, Andrew Ivaska and Frederic Cooper all highlight the British colonial rhetoric that 
also portrayed colonized Africans as non-urban people.  By presenting a mission to preserve 118
and protect the rural, traditional and authentic identity of colonized Africans British colonialists 
delegitimized the presence of Africans in colonial cities. The British colonialists argued that 
Africans were more accustomed to agrarian life and so belonged to rural areas whilst white 
settlers who were familiar to cities in the metropole rightfully belonged in the urban areas. Thus, 
the demonstrated disdain shown by TANU towards Dar es Salaam youth bore eerie similarities to 
that of the British. 
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 TANU argued that the move of the capital to Dodoma was in a bid to benefit rural 
populations, preserve natural landscapes and build an authentic African city. Despite being 
located in the rural hinterlands of Tanzania, Dodoma itself was an undeveloped region with 
limited infrastructure - a blank canvas of possibility. The Nyerere administration believed that 
Dodoma was an ideal location for a city as unlike Dar es Salaam it was in the heartland of 
village. Furthermore Dodoma was surrounded with vast natural spaces thus possessing “one of 
the greatest opportunities to create a new city that is in harmony with its total environment.’  119
Unlike Dar es Salaam which possessed an non-African (Arabic) name and bore foreign 
influences, Nyerere instructed that the new capital be built with local materials and: “Dodoma 
must be a town which is built in simple style but with buildings which reflect the light, air, and 
space of Africa. It must reflect the future and there must be room to grow, but it must not be 
futuristic in the sense of symbolizing passing and individualistic emotions.’  120
 To ensure the transfer of the capital ran smoothly, President Nyerere commissioned a 
Ministry of Capital Development (Wizard ya Kusimamia Shughli za Makao Makuu) on October 
5, 1973 to oversee the relocation of the capital.  President Nyerere, himself, served as the 121
Minister of Capital Development. Chief Adam Sapi Mkwawa, grandson of Chief Mkwawa of the 
Hehe tribe who led the Maji Maji rebellion against the Germans and was killed in 1898, was 
appointed by Nyerere as Minister of State to oversee the transfer of the capital. Other members 
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of the Capital Authority included the “Ministers of Commerce, Finance, Economic Affairs and 
Development Planning, Communications and Works and Land, Housing and Urban 
Development, and the Regional Commissioner in Dodoma.’  John Machunda was appointed as 122
Principle Secretary for the ministry and George Kahama as the Director General of the Capital 
Authority.  Finally a Capital Development Authority Members of the Capital Development 123
Authority then made several visits to other newly transferred capital cities such as Lilongwe in 
Malawi. After reviewing several applications from several international firms, including a 124
Japanese firm and a Greek firm, on August 1, 1974 the Capital Development Authority 
commissioned a Canadian planning firm, Planning Associates of Toronto to plan the new city.  125
Dodoma, the Garden City and the Global Planning Trends 
 It is difficult to reconcile the themes of Tanzanian Self-Reliance in the Arusha 
Declaration with the TANU action of hiring a foreign Canadian planning firm to plan the city of 
Dodoma. The plan was directed by Macklin Hancock, the firm’s founder and lead landscape 
architect and planner. Hancock is arguably one of Canada’s most prominent urban planners. 
Hancock’s most widely recognized design is his plan for the Canadian suburb, Don Mills, the 
first privately funded planned settlement in the country. 
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 Heavily inspired by the North American suburbanization movements pioneered by 
Clarence Stein and Henry Stein, Hancock’s plan for Don Mills paid homage to Ebenezer 
Howard’s Garden City. Having graduated with a bachelor’s degree in agriculture and worked in 
his family’s nurseries, one can further conclude that Hancock was an avid nature lover. 
Unsurprisingly, Hancock incorporated large amounts of natural foliage, green belts and open 
space in his plan for Don Mills.  Another unique characteristic of Hancock’s plan for Don Mills 126
unlike other suburbs is lack of emphasis on cars. In a post-war automative industry, Hancock 
sought to downplay the role of cars in urban space by placing motor roads on the periphery. He 
instead chose to emphasize pedestrian path ways and bicycle lanes by making them central in his 
plan.  127
 Community and social relations was another emphasis of the plan for Don Mills. The 
town was sectioned off into four separate neighborhoods centered around a shopping district in 
order to facilitate community amongst neighbors. Each neighborhood had public spaces and 
parks to foster social interactions amongst neighbors. Hancock also featured curved roads in 
between houses and houses with large picture windows that faced the street to further foster 
community.  Another common feature of Hancock’s design was the sectioning of the 128
neighborhoods into zones: namely the commercial zones, the residential zones, public parks and 
central to each neighborhood were the schools.  
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 Hancock also promoted community, industry integration and self-sufficiency. 
Consequently, residential areas in Don Mills were located very close to places of work. Hancock 
intended that residents would not have to commute far to go to work. The wide availability of 
pedestrian paths and bicycle lanes throughout the centre of the town further facilitated the 
community and industrial integration. Hancock also emphasized mixed housing in his design, 
seeking Don Mills’ residents to be diverse in social economic backgrounds. Consequently, Don 
Mills featured different style of houses from apartment blocks to semi detached houses.   129
 Hancock’s plan for Don Mills had several similarities with his plan for the Tanzanian 
capital of Dodoma. Hancock’s plan for Dodoma also provided several public spaces to facilitate 
community and social interactions. He designed the People’s Square to be in the middle of the 
city as a place for public gatherings in line with the nation’s socialist values. A similar 
neighborhood structure like that of Don Mills was also implemented in the plan for Dodoma. 
Dodoma was also divided in several neighborhoods, however, with a more intimate residential 
setting than that of Don Mills. He designed houses in a cluster of ten houses enforcing 
community amongst neighbors:  
“The basic housing unit of the residential community is the TANU housing cell… 
The houses in each cell are grouped around a small communal… These provide 
the opportunity for daily social contact, avoiding the alienation created by many 
city environments, and providing an informal forum for the discussion of matters 
of common interest and concern.  130
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 Hancock chose to divide Dodoma into clusters of communities comprising 28,000 people 
each. Each community consisted of four neighborhoods of 7,000 residents each. His decision to 
section Dodoma’s population into communities were for management purposes: 
The planning should be done on a neighborhood basis, as this provides for 
a convenient frame-work for distribution of essential services like primary 
schools, shopping, health, social and community needs. This planning 
concept provides for a social environment for a community development 
in line with Tanzania's socialistic pattern and over-all Government 
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Figure 2.3 Two TANU Ten-house 
Cells Surrounding a Communal Space 
(Source Project Planning Associates)
Figure 2.4 Single Model Community 
(Source Project Planning Associates)
policy…the master plan should also aim at providing commercial and 
work centers in district and residential areas to avoid unnecessary 
movement of people.  131
Hancock believed that by sectioning the city like he did with Don Mills, it would be easier to 
provide social services to the citizens of Tanzania. 
Like his plan for Don Mills, Hancock intended Dodoma’s transit system to further 
facilitate social interactions. He hoped that by placing a greater emphasis on public 
transportation, bicycle lanes and 
public walkways, Tanzanians 
would have greater possibilities 
of social interactions with 
another. As such, he placed the 
public busways and public 
walkways in the centre of each 
neighborhood unit whilst placing 
motor ways on the periphery of 
the city:  
The master plan for the city, at 
local scale, includes numerous 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r s o c i a l 
interaction, not the least of which 
is the busway. This is seen, not 
only as an efficient mechanical 
transportation system, but also as 
an opportunity for meeting and 
 Ibid., 30.131
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Figure 2.5 Detail of Community Center 
(Source Project Planning Associates)
discussion, both on the bus and at the busway stations. The walkway systems in 




Figure 2.6 A community of four 
neighborhoods. The furthest neighborhood 
is 1 km walk from the nearest bus stop 
(Source Project Planning Associates)
Figure 2.7 Dodoma Transportation Plan 
(Source Project Planning Associates)
Social relations and community were thus promoted in the Dodoma Master Plan through the 
prevalence of public transit ways. 
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Figure 2.8 Plan for Bicycle ways and Pedestrian 
Paths (Project Planning Associates)
  Hancock also designed each neighborhood unit in line with his goals for of self-
sufficiency and community and industrial integration. Each residential section was conveniently 
located to the community centre which consisted of employment areas, commercial centers, 
communal facilities and secondary schools (see Figure 2.5). Furthermore, the industrial and 
residential sectors were closely connected by bus ways, pedestrian paths and bicycle lanes, 
allowing residents to commute to work cheaply without cars: A highly developed system of 
public transportation, walkways and bicycle ways in the Capital is essential to avoid the need for 
private automobiles. The design of the Master Plan is, therefore, entirely based on the principle 
that all houses, work places and public facilities will always be within easy walking distance 
from a public transportation stop (see Figure 2.6). This could result in a city which can become a 
contemporary example of an urban environment which minimizes the high economic and 
environmental costs associated with cars.”  133
 Another similar feature the Dodoma plan had with Don Mills was the emphasis on green 
spaces. Hancock took care to ensure each neighborhood unit was surrounded with a green 
belt.“ [O]n the larger scale, and at a more symbolic level, the city was laid out so as to enable the 
open space of the landscape to flow through it. In this way every community would be close to 
major parkland, hills or green space.”  The plan for Dodoma did not only feature public 134
recreation parks but also sought to preserve wildlife conservation areas as well as the natural 
landscape. Furthermore, green spaces were also provided to neighborhoods to promote self-
reliance by allowing residents to grow their own food. Hancock seemed to pay heed to neither 
 Dodoma Master Plan 137133
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Howard’s principles for the garden city nor to the Arusha declaration which gave considerate 
emphasis to land and agriculture: “The master plan [of Dodoma] should take advantage of every 
natural feature that the chosen city site has to offer and should be integrated with existing 
developments as far as possible.”  135
 Looking at Hancock’s plans for Dodoma as well as from understanding his vision for 
Don Mills, one can see strong correlations with the Garden City Movement championed by 
Ebenezer Howard. In 18988, the Garden City Movement was a method of urban planning that 
 Ibid., 30.135
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Figure 2.9 Landscape Plans for 
Dodoma 
(Source Project Planning Associates)
arose from the great dissatisfaction Howard and several of his contemporaries had with what 
they deemed as the wiles of the European industrial city - overcrowding, individualism, slums 
and pollution. The garden city movement was an alternative urban self-contained community for 
the working class society to escape the problems of the industrial city. The key components of 
Howard’s garden city was communal ownership of land and the prevalence of green spaces. The 
garden city was enclosed by a green belt to act as a buffer for the growing city.  The Garden 136
City Movement went on to be adopted in several parts of the world, the British even adopted the 
garden city model in some of their colonial cities, for example in the plans for Lusaka and 
Zanzibar.  137
 Hancock was greatly influenced by the Garden City Movement as evident from his plans. 
Like Howard, he incorporated green spaces and a green belt in his city plans (see figure 2.9). 
Similarly, Hancock designed his cities to be self-contained like the idealized garden city. One can 
also draw parallels between the garden city and Nyerere’s vision of an African socialist city. 
Similar to Howard’s disdain for the industrial European city, Nyerere had a dissatisfaction with 
the congested nature of Dar es Salaam which influenced his decision to transfer the capital city. 
Thus, how effectively did Hancock realize Nyerere’s vision of the Tanzanian capital city? 
 Hancock’s team used the four prerequisites (i) Land and Agriculture, (ii) the Policy of 
Socialism and Self-Reliance, (iii) Good Policies, and (iv) Good Leadership to inform the plans 
 For a detailed study on the Garden city see Sir Ebenezer Howard. Garden Cities of Tomorrow. Vol. 3. (London: 136
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for Dodoma.  The prerequisites of Land and Agriculture were fulfilled by the incorporation of 138
the natural environment such as nature reserves, parks and communal farms in the Dodoma plans 
(see Figure 8). Furthermore, Howard’s  preservation of green spaces in the garden city aligned 
with Nyerere’s stance of land prerequisite for development. Socialism was achieved by the 
emphasis on shared communal facilities and neighborhoods designed for people of different 
backgrounds to live together. The principle of self-reliance was actualized through the plans 
inclusion of arable lands in all the communities for residents to be able grow their own food.  139
Howard’s garden city movement which idealized communal ownership of land also aligned well 
with the Arusha declaration principles of socialism and self-reliance. The principles of good 
leadership and good policies were actualized through the TANU housing cells designed in the 
plans. Each ten-house cell would have a TANU member living amongst them to provide 
leadership to the cell members and educate them on socialism: 
The Cell is the smallest unit, at the grass-roots level. It consists of the people living in a 
group of ten-houses, under a Cell leader, who is a TANU member. The 10-house Cell is 
designed so that the people will meet and know each other and will share the 
responsibility of resolving each other’s problems and of ensuring the implementation of 
the policies of Socialism and Self-Reliance.   140
 Upon the completion of the draft of the master plan by Hancock and the Project Planning 
Associates, underwent review before it was finalized. The plan was first presented to and 
approved by the Directors of the Capital Development Authority in February 1975. That same 
month, the plan was then reviewed by an International Advisory Panel organized by the United 




Nations Environment Programme. Members of the Panel includes experts in the field from 
Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America as well as Tanzanian Ministers. The Panel was 
chaired by Sir John Overall, the former Commissioner of the National Capital Development 
Commission of Australia.  TANU acknowledged that “[members of the Panel] living in a 
capitalist, industrialized milieu could not entirely appreciate the social and economic constraints 
involved in a plan for an African socialist environment”  Finally, President Nyerere reviewed 141
the plans and gave his endorsement of the plan, evidence of the plan’s compliance with the 
Arusha Declaration: “I believe this Plan, as it stands, is consistent with the ideology of 
Tanzania…I commend this Master Plan to the people of Tanzania.”  142
Responses to the decision to transfer the Tanzanian capital to Dodoma 
 President Julius Nyerere’s decision to transfer the Tanzanian capital from the well-
established coastal city of Dar es Salaam to the largely rural and undeveloped town of Dodoma 
received many mixed responses. Nyerere’s vision for Ujamaa in Dodoma was not only restricted 
to an ideal of Tanzanian kinship but a global kinship. In a letter A. H. Kellas, an officer in the 
British High Commission in Dar es Salaam informed his superior in the British East African 
Department, M. K. Evans of an invitation made by the Tanzanian government to all foreign 
dignitaries to join a “diplomatic Ujamaa village” in Dodoma.  As a part of this diplomatic 143
village, each foreign embassy or high commission would be permitted to have a building that 
 Ibid., 3.141
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reflected their nation’s culture and heritage. One can argue that this call to form a diplomatic 
Ujamaa village was symbolic of Nyerere’s ideology of having a wider global Ujamaa movement 
in which the various countries of the world performed as one large collective family unit.  144
 The British were not supportive of Nyerere’s decision to transfer the capital nor were they 
willing to join an Ujamaa global village in Dodoma. In response to Nyerere’s invitation for the 
British High Commission to relocate to Dodoma and join a global village, M. K. Evans of the 
British East Africa Department remarked “I think we should be careful not to allow ourselves to 
be maneuvered into contributing to this idiotic move.’  Evans’ harsh remarks reflects the 145
British utter dismissal of Tanzanian efforts to transfer the capital, viewing the decision as 
ridiculous. One can further consider whether the British dismissal of the new Tanzanian capital 
also signified a rejection of Nyerere’s ideology of African socialism.  
 The decision to relocate the capital to Dodoma was branded as Afrocentric and 
nationalistic motives. According to the British foreign and commonwealth office, Dodoma 
signified for Nyerere a truly African city whilst Dar es Salaam represented foreign domination 
and thus bore painful colonial legacies: “more important in the President [Nyerere’]s mind is the 
fact that, where even the name of Dar-es-Salaam is not African but Arabic, Dodoma is wholly 
African, owing nothing to the Portuguese, Arabs, Indians, Germans, British or rather rapacious 
intruders. So the move in some sense an African gesture, a return to “authenticity”, and the 
 Ibid.; Priya Lal. "African Socialism and the Limits of Global Familyhood: Tanzania and the New International 144
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nationalistic motive which is so potent nowadays has proved again compelling.”  Besides 146
deeming Nyerere’s decision to transfer the capital as “idiotic,” M. K. Evans goes on to criticize 
Nyerere’s notion to create a truly African city as ‘African “authenticity” to the point where one 
takes leave to doubt if [Nyerere] really is interested in development in any modern sense.’  147
Thus, the British opined Nyerere’s vision for the new capital city as one that would drive 
Tanzania back to antiquity. Perhaps the British feared Nyerere was trying to unravel all that they 
had established in colonial Tanzania? 
 Nyerere’s vision for Dodoma emphasized people and community as a significant element 
of the city. He had little concern for developing skyscrapers in Dodoma preferring that buildings 
in the city’s commercial zone be restricted to only four stories. Nyerere insisted that Tanzanian 
citizens living in equality be the central focus of Dodoma rather than the buildings of the city . 
The British sarcastically responded to Nyerere’s people-centered city: 
If need be, [Nyerere] would have Ministers, Government and party up at Dodoma in next 
to no time housed in caravans or barracks, and the National Assembly in session under a 
baobab tree. He does not dream of towered cities ; he would not be much distress if the 
new capital turns out to be a modest kraal [an African village], provided only that it is 
full of happy, co-operative and equal Africans ; for “small is beautiful.148
 In the above remark, the British High commissioner to Dar es Salaam makes some rather snarky 
remarks towards Nyerere’s idea for the new capital whilst making jabs at the “small is beautiful 
movement” championed by Schumacher. Schumacher also exulted appropriate technology as a 
solution to development, citing appropriate technology as modest means to development by 
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focusing on a developing country’s existing capacity. Nyerere’s policy of African socialism and 
self-reliance had striking similarities with Schumacher’s “small is beautiful movement’ 
particularly their shared emphasis on the agricultural sector. Thus the British were also critical of 
Schumacher’s ideology as they were of Nyerere’s vision of urbanization. Once again the British 
were unsupportive of Nyerere’s policy of self-reliance as symbolized through the city of 
Dodoma.  
 The community aspect of Dodoma was also poorly received by the British. Nyerere 
perpetually emphasized that the new capital was designed to facilitate community: “I want you to 
give emphasis to community type of living so that when a person comes back from work he 
doesn’t live in isolation and separation.”  The British High Commissioner to Dar es Salaam 149
interpreted Nyerere’s attempt for nation-building and ujamaa in Dodoma as ‘the focus of the 
[Tanzanian] Government’s most strenuous effort in social engineering, the concentration of 
impecunious peasants in small villages (ujamaa).’  Nyerere’s commitment to creating a truly 150
community and ujamaa-centered city was also translated to Dodoma’s transport system.  He 
envisions Dodoma’s transport plan to be centered on public transport and bicycle usage in the 
following: ‘I would like you to plan for public transportation because the idea of private car 
ownership in Tanzania is very remote to us. Think also of bicycles in our new city of 
Dodoma.’   151
 Capital Development Authority, Capital Development Authority Press Release: Mwalimu Approves Interim Plan 149
for Dodoma Issued by the Office of the Director General (Dodoma:Capital Development Authority, 2 August 1974)
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 Ultimately in dismissal of the plan for Dodoma, British High Commissioner Kellas 
depicts Nyerere as an enemy of progress and modernity. Kellas argues that“[Tanzania is] opting 
out of the 20th Century’ and that by [e]arnestly desiring progress on his own terms, President 
Nyerere thereby appears to risk losing a race that he does not believe in.”  It is rather intriguing 152
that whilst the British are quick to pin Nyerere as one who is against progress they fail to 
acknowledge the significant role played by the Canadian firm, Project Planning Associates 
Limited, in the plan of Dodoma. Before the plan for Dodoma, the founder of Project Planning 
Associates, Macklin Hancock, designed a town, Don Mills, which bears similar characteristics to 
the city of Dodoma. As discussed earlier, Don Mills was also designed as a people and 
community-centered town with an emphasis on public transport and bicycle lanes. The British 
label these characteristics as what brand Dodoma as a city of African antiquity whilst there exists 
a Western town, Don Mills with this very same characteristics. It is also most ironic that the lead 
architect working under Project Planning Associates Limited that oversees the Dodoma plan is 
Mr R N Percival, a British national.  In addition, the design principles adopted in the plans for 153
Dodoma had their origins to the garden city movement, an urban plan spearheaded by the British 
Howard. The British themselves adopted this very same garden city principles in the design of 
some their own colonial cities including Zanzibar. 
 The cost of the new capital Dodoma was another source of contention for the British. The 
Tanzanian government estimated that the transfer to the new capital would cost £226million.  It 154
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sought foreign aid to fund the project even approaching the British for funding as well as support 
and technical expertise.  One cannot help but wonder why the self-reliance proclaiming 155
Tanzanian government not only sought Western aid but sought assistance from the very 
colonizers they fought for their freedom. The British were reluctant to assist the Tanzanian 
government deeming the project ‘an unnecessary and on the face of it a waste of money.’  The 156
British believed that the moving the capital to Dodoma would be a lost venture as “the 
possibilities could be great but it also could be lost though Tanzanian inefficiency.’   157
 To rid the Tanzanian urban space of colonial legacies, the Nyerere government 
envisioned a brand new city that complemented rural collective farms, was self-sufficient and 
embodied African socialism. These were characteristics, Nyerere’s socialist government 
disassociated with the colonially influenced city of Dar es Salaam. Realizing this new African 
socialist city of Dodoma was a different story. The reliance on the West for urban planners and 
financial aid, however, complicated this vision of Tanzanian self-reliance and African socialism. 
In dismissing the plans to relocate the capital to Dodoma as foolish and African backwardness, 
the British did not recognize its global validity. After all, the plans for Dodoma belonged to the 
transnational garden city movement, a movement the British themselves had once ascribed to in 
designing their own colonial cities. Ultimately, one is left with the question whether one can 
fully realize or evaluate a postcolonial city without taking into account global trends, influences 
or even money sources. 
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CHAPTER II: 
Abuja: A Center for Unity and Ethnic Neutrality? 
 65
 The Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, revealed the fragile national identity of Africa’s 
most populous nation, a country that comprises over 250 different ethnicities. The war exposed 
deep-seated legacies of colonialism within the country in ethnic, religious and political tensions. 
The war itself was triggered by ethnic violence against the Igbo, one of the ethnic groups in 
Nigeria, competition over the control of oil wealth in the Niger Delta, and a series of military 
coups. After the war, attempts were made by the Nigerian government to promote a unified, 
national Federal identity. One significant step made towards restoring the fractured nation was 
re-envisioning the Federal capital of the country.  
 On August 9, 1975, military President General Murtala Mohammed established an eight-
member Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital of Nigeria, the "Aguda Panel,” 
chaired by Honorable Justice Timothy Akinola Aguda.  The Committee was tasked with the 158
mandate to examine the suitability of Lagos as both a Federal Capital and a State capital. In the 
event that the Committee deemed Lagos an unsuitable Capital for both governments, it was 
expected to propose alternative locations. In consideration of the mandate and in search of a new 
Federal Capital Territory, the Committee travelled to all of the country’s state capitals as well as 
multiple cities in different countries to gather information These included Dodoma in Tanzania; 
Mombasa and Nairobi, Kenya; Lusaka and Livingstone, Zambia; Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil; Sydney and Canberra, Australia; Islamabad and Karachi, Pakistan; Gaborone, Botswana 
and New Delhi, India. In a report published on 20 December 1975, the Committee concluded 
Committee On The Location of The Federal Capital of Nigeria Report [Hereafter Location of the Federal 158
Capital] (9 Abayomi Road, Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria: December 1975),10.
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that Lagos was unable to serve as a dual State and Federal capital. Instead, the Committee 
advised that a new Federal capital city be established.  159
Why Abuja? Reasons for the Transfer of the Capital 
 The decision to transfer the Federal Capital was primarily motivated to heal the wounds 
of the painful civil war. In 1914, Nigeria was hastily amalgamated by her British colonial rulers 
who paid little heed to the ethnic, political and religious differences of the local people. The 
British arbitrarily carved up the Nigerian colony in regions along the lines of ethnic and religious 
identity. Each region was ruled separately under a system of indirect rule so as to foster 
‘communal loyalty.’  The Northern region comprised mainly of the Hausa and Fulani ethnic 160
groups, the Eastern region was dominated by the Igbo ethnic group and the Western region was 
mainly occupied by the Yoruba ethnic group.  The British pursued divisive politics amongst the 161
colonized peoples. Not all ethnic groups were treated equally by the colonizers. Some ethnic 
groups were commonly pitted against others.  162
At Independence, regions of the country that were ruled separately during colonialism 
were suddenly brought together to form a federal government. It is thus no surprise, that even 
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after Nigeria’s Independence from the British on October 1, 1960, deep ethnic tensions existed 
amongst the people of Nigeria. The ethnic tensions eventually culminated in a brutal civil war, 
the Biafra-Nigerian civil war of 1967-70. In the year prior to the war, faced by violence and 
persecution against Igbos in the Northern region and unsatisfied with the domination of the 
Federal government by Northerners, Igbo seceded from the country to form the state of Biafra. 
The civil war was waged by the Nigerian government to restore the seceded state of Biafra. A 
new Federal capital city was thus sought to foster reconciliation, ensure stability and promote a 
strong national identity.   163
 The period following Independence had also been marked by political frictions. The 
major ethnic groups fought for political power while the minority ethnic groups complained of 
lack of representation and being dominated by the major ethnic groups. The largest ethnic groups 
in Nigeria consist of the Hausa, the Igbos and the Yoruba. With each regional leaders seeking 
greater regional autonomy, political clashes and corruption were rife in the Federal 
Government.  Thus, to quell claims for political power by the majority ethnic groups, it was 164
decided to relocate the capital from coastal Lagos which is located in the Yoruba homeland and 
is primarily populated by people of Yoruba descent.   165
 The Committee undertook a number of steps in order to accommodate the needs of the 
different groups of Nigeria. To begin with, the committee sought the opinions of Nigerians on 
whether the Federal capital should be relocated from Lagos through a memorandum published in 
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the local newspapers. The Committee then consulted with various professionals and 
organizations on the matter in addition to consulting with traditional rulers and religious leaders 
such as Chiefs, Obas, Emirs and Imans.  The Committee concluded that positioning the Federal 166
capital in a “more central location would provide equal access to Nigeria’s great diversity of 
cultural groups.”  Thus, in a bid to subdue ethnic tension and foster national unity, the 167
Committee decided to locate the Federal Capital in an “ethnically neutral” territory, in a region 
that was not dominated by one of the major ethnic groups.  168
 Overpopulation, insufficient land space and vast inequalities were some of the other 
challenges that the Committee identified with the former Federal Capital City. As a coastal city, a 
former slave port and the administrative center of the colonial government, British colonialists 
invested most in the economic infrastructures of Lagos than any other part of the country. The 
Northern regions of Nigeria, particularly were most deprived and underdeveloped in 
comparison.  From colonial times until the present, Lagos remains the economic hub of 169
Nigeria. Since Nigeria’s Independence, the city of Lagos had been growing at a rapid rate. With 
little economic prospects or infrastructure in the rural areas and other towns, thousands of 
Nigerians flocked into the city of Lagos with hopes of a better future. The population of Lagos 
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grew astronomically from 230, 256 in 1950 to 665,246 in 1963.  The Committee believed a 170
new Federal capital would stimulate Nigeria’s interior development, promote economic 
infrastructure in areas other than Lagos and provide job opportunities for Nigerians.  171
 Lagos was also cited by the Committee as a city of great inequalities in which Lagosians 
of lower classes experienced a poorer quality of life in contrast to their wealthier counterparts. 
Lagos boasted wealthy suburbs as well as some of largest slums in Africa. These inequalities 
however dated back to colonial times in which the wealthier, underpopulated “Island” of Lagos 
(consisting of multiple islands such as Victoria Island, Lagos Island, Ikoyi,) was exclusively 
inhabited by British colonialists and expatriates. Contrastingly, colonized Africans were 
restricted to mainland Lagos which bore slums that were overpopulated, ungoverned and bore 
little social facilities.  After Independence, Lagos was no longer divided along race lines but by 172
class. Suburbs such as Ikoyi that where formerly occupied by British colonialists were inhabited 
by wealthy upper-class Nigerians. Slums like Ajegunle continued to be resource-deprived and 
inhabited by lower class Nigerians.  The Committee concluded that a new Federal Capital 173
accessible to all Nigerians was necessary.  174
 The Committee identified overpopulation and insufficient land space as further 
weaknesses associated with Lagos. With the 1973 discovery of oil reserves along the Niger Delta 
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cost, Nigeria experienced an oil boom. The 1970s oil boom drew an influx of Nigerians in search 
of economic prosperity into the city. Multitudes of oil tycoons rushed into Lagos to invest in 
properties and drove land prices up. Consequently, the city of Lagos has been challenged with 
issues of high rents, land speculation, housing scarcity and consequently the formation of slums. 
The issue of housing shortages could not be easily resolved as Lagos is a coastal city with little 
room for expansion except through the expensive process of land filling. The Committee 
characterized Lagos as a filthy, crowded, and overpopulated city. Her transit ways were 
perpetually congested with vehicles causing commuters to spend several hours in traffic.  The 175
Committee thus sought a new Federal capital with sufficient land area for future expansion. 
 Crime and moral degradation were other issues, the Committee associated with Lagos.  In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, Lagos notably had a high prevalence of corruption, organized 
crime syndicates and “Area boys” (youth gangs). In a study on crime in Lagos and Ibadan, 
historian Laurent Fourchard traces the rise of Area boys and organized crime to the Great 
Depression in colonial Nigeria. He argues colonial policies hampered social relations of 
Africans, restricted the economic opportunities of African urban residents and consequently 
produced more serious forms of crime that continued to plague Lagos after Independence. 
According to Fourchard, crime syndicates began to emerge in the 1930s in impoverished areas 
where unemployed African migrants from the rural areas settled.  After the Nigerian Civil war, 176
Lagosian crime syndicates became notoriously violence and increasingly unmanageable by 
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police forces.  Indeed, the crime rates of Lagos provided suitable grounds to transfer the 177
Federal Capital. 
 The Nigerian postcolonial government further justified the transfer of the Federal capital 
as a bid to counter Eurocentric dominance. The Committee believed Lagos was heavily 
influenced by European culture as evident from the city’s Eurocentric name. Originally named 
Èkó by its Yoruba inhabitants, the Portuguese renamed the coastal city to Lagos (Portuguese for 
lagoon) and thus began years of European imperialism and colonial domination by firstly the 
Portuguese and then the British. Districts and streets of Lagos were named after British 
figureheads and colonialists such as Victoria Island named after Queen Victoria and Lugard 
Avenue named in honor of Frederick Lugard, the first Governor of the Nigeria colony. Members 
of the Committee argued that a new Federal Capital City represented an opportunity for a fresh 
start, a city free from the colonial culture and problems associated with Lagos.  178
 The country’s newfound economic prosperity made the transfer of the Federal capital 
appear viable. In 1975, the Western world was still recovering from an economic recession. 
African countries like Tanzania suffered from financial destitution but, in the 1970s, Nigeria 
enjoyed a season of financial prosperity from her oil revenue. In his book Abuja: The Single 
Most Ambitious Urban Design Project of the 20th Century, leading authority on Abuja 
architectural historian Nnamdi Elleh, argues the decision to move the Nigerian capital from 
Lagos was a calculated move by Nigerian authorities to display the newfound wealth and riches 
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of the country.  Equipped with immense finances from oil revenue and faced with the 179
deficiencies of Lagos, the 1970s Nigerian government  viable step towards  dismantling harmful 
colonial legacies.  
Movements towards the Capital Transfer 
 In 1976, the Murtala Mohammed administration began efforts to relocate both the Federal 
Capital and state capital from Lagos based on the recommendation of the Committees. In that 
year, the State capital of Lagos was transferred to Ikeja, a town in Lagos State. In addition, 
Mohammed ratified Decree No. 6, the Federal Capital Territory Act, and established a Federal 
Capital Territory modeled after the United States’ District of Columbia.  Covering an area of 180
8,000 square kilometers, a Federal Capital Territory was carved from the States of Kogi, 
Nasarawa and Niger located in the central part of Nigeria. The new Capital City of Nigeria, 
located within Federal Capital Territory, was named after a nearby small rural town called Abuja. 
To avoid confusion between the new capital city, the rural town was renamed Suleja.    181
 To oversee the development of the new Capital City of Nigeria, a Federal Capital 
Development Authority (FCDA) was created. The FCDA in turn enlisted two advisory panels:  a 
Technical Assessment Panel of several Nigerian experts and an International Review Panel with 
noted personalities like Mr. M. N. Sharma, the Chief Architect of Chandigarh, India; Mr G. 
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Khama, the Director General of the Capital Development Authority in Dodoma, Tanzania;  and 
Mr. F. L. Roche, the General Manager of the Milton Keynes Development Corporation.  In 182
addition to the advisory panels, urban planners, landscape architects, and professionals were 
commissioned from overseas to design the new city. In June 1977, a consortium of three 
American planning firms called the International Planning Associates (IPA) were commissioned 
to design the Master Plan for Abuja. The IPA consisted of the Planning Research Corporation, 
Archisystems, and Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd.  Unsurprisingly, with the inclusion of 183
American urban planners, several elements of the Abuja plan were very similar to the Mall of 
Washington, DC in the United States. The British firm Milton Keynes Development Corporation 
was enlisted to develop an “Accelerated District’ for upper and middle class residents whilst 
 Abuja Master Plan, iii.182
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Figure 3.1 Proximity of the Federal 
Capital Territory to Major Nigerian cities. 
(Source International Planning Associates)
Greek engineering firm Doxiadis Associates were charged with creating a master plan for the 
Federal Capital Territory in its entirety.  Japanese architect and member of the Congrès 184
International d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM), Kenzo Tange also served as the lead architect and 
urban designer for the Central area in Abuja. Tange’s firm, Kenzo Tange & URTEC were 
awarded the contract for Abuja over the Canadian firm, Project Planning Associates who 
 Vale, Architecture, Power and National Identity,157.184
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Figure 3.2 Location of the Federal Capital 
Territory amongst other Nigerian States. 
(Source International Planning Associates)
designed the Master Plan of Dodoma, Tanzania.  The plans of the central new Federal Capital 185
of Nigeria featured modernist skyscrapers, ornate buildings and a highly sophisticated circulation 
system, which was modeled after Tange’s native Tokyo.   186
 The Federal Capital Development Authority issued a twenty-year time line for the 
development of the Federal Capital City. Occupancy of Abuja was scheduled for 1986 with a 
planned initial population of 150,000 residents. The year 2000 was the target year for finished 
construction of the new capital. The city of Abuja was also designed for a targeted population of 
1.6 million people and a maximum capacity for 3 million people which was similar to Le 
Corbusier’s City for 3 Million Inhabitants.  This is unsurprising as Tange was greatly 187
influenced by Le Corbusier. The Master Plan was completed in 1979, the ground was broken in 
1981, and construction for the new Federal Capital City began.  Shortly thereafter, the major 188
infrastructures and first government buildings were constructed in 1982 and 1983.  On 12 189
December 1991, Abuja was inaugurated as the new Federal capital of Nigeria. The following 
sections will explore the transfer of the Federal Capital in further detail. 
Themes and Symbols in the Master Plan for the New Federal Capital City:  
 Elleh, Abuja, 38.185
 Ibid, 52.186
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on 10 March 1981, C T Hart, British High Commission, 12 March 1981, FCO 65/2647, File Nigeria: development 
of new federal capital city at Abuja, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: West African Department: Registered Files 
(JW Series),The British National Archives, Kew Gardens, United Kingdom.
 76
 National unity, ethnic neutrality and equality were major themes in the Abuja Master 
Plan. The Committee concluded in their report the following:  
(i) A New Capital in a more central location would provide equal access to 
Nigeria’s great  diversity of cultural groups. 
(ii)  A New Capital is desirable that would be secure, ethnically neutral, 
centrally accessible, comfortable and healthful, and possess adequate land 
natural resources to provide a promising base for urban development.  
(iii) A New Capital is needed as a symbol of Nigeria’s aspirations for unity and 
greatness.  190
Based on these key conclusions, Abuja was seen as an ideal site for a Federal Capital City. The 
new Federal capital Territory and City were purposefully located in the center of the country in a 
region that was populated by three minority ethnic groups.   191
 Federal Government and the commitment to democracy are other major themes in the 
Abuja Master Plan. On 13 February 1976, Military President Mohamed was assassinated in a 
failed coup and was replaced by his deputy General Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo handed over 
military to civilian rule and in October 1st 1979, President Alhaji Shehu Shagari was elected. 
The return to civilian rule was also marked by the publication of the Abuja Master Plan in 1979. 
In addition, a new democratic Constitution based on the American constitution was drafted that 
year. The new Shagari administration actively pursued the transfer of the Federal Capital. The 
administration notably contracted Tange as the head urban designer and architect of the central 
area of Abuja.  The publication of the Abuja Master Plan, the draft of the new democratic 192
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Constitution and the election of a civilian government in the same year, all indicated Nigeria’s 
return to democracy.   193
 The planners of Abuja were charged to design an administrative capital city that gave 
great emphasis to the Federal government. The founding purpose of the Abuja Master Plan was 
“to organize the principal elements of both the natural and the built environments to emphasize 
the symbolic aspects of the government of Nigeria.”  Abuja was thus designed as a central city, 194
with the Federal government buildings occupying the Central Area of the city: “[t]he Central 
Area Plan should acknowledge the special nature of the seat of Federal Government as a major 
symbol of Nigerian unity.”  195
To give significance to the Federal Government, the planners took advantage of the 
topography of the land. The planners believed that placing Abuja’s government buildings on 
hills, was consciously “[in] contrast to the very formal malls of Brasilia and Washington, the 
New Federal Capital City Mall is structured in response to the natural environment and uses the 
chain of low hills and transverse shallow valleys to emphasize the key public buildings.”  The 196
focal point of the city of Abuja is Aso Rock, a large granite rock that towers over the city. At the 
foot of Aso rock lies the Three Arm Zone: the Presidential Complex, the National Assembly 
Complex and the Supreme Court complex.  As a Federal republic, Nigeria’s three arms of 197
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power comprise of the President, the National Assembly (the Senate and the House of 
Representatives) and the Supreme Court. The three Federal government buildings were 
strategically placed at the foot of Aso rock: “[a]dignified location for the seat of National 
Government placed in a prominent location emphasized by an axial focus on the highest point of 
Aso Hill.”  The careful consideration given to key Federal Government buildings was aimed at 198
attributing significance to the Federation. 
 Another major focus of the Abuja master plan was the culture and different traditions of 
Nigeria. The planners sought to pay homage to the different religious, ethnic and cultural 
practices represented in Nigeria. They noted that the ‘major shortcoming’ in the planning of most 
postcolonial cities was the ignoring of indigenous architecture and urban patterns.  Most of the 199
planned cities that the Committee on the Federal Capital visited such as Brasilia were modernist 
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Figure 3.3 Axiality of Aso Rock. Three Arm Zone buildings are aligned 
along the Axis of Aso Rock (Source International Planning Association)
in nature with little reference of indigenous architectural practices  The planners thus set the 200
following mandate for the Abuja Master Plan: “[T]he New Capital City of Nigeria must preserve 
 Ibid., 27.200
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Figure 3.4 Model of Central Area of Abuja with Aso Rock in the 
background. (Source International Planning Associates )
and build on that which is unique and valuable in Nigeria’s urban tradition.”  To gain 201
inspiration for the Abuja Plan, the planners visited multiple towns in Nigeria including savannah 
towns, forest towns and new towns (colonial towns).  
 The planners sought to incorporate traditional architecture and recreate the various 
observed urban traditions in the Abuja plan. One such tradition the planners recreated in Abuja 
was designing a central city in which districts consisting of residential areas and small industries 
were placed on the periphery and the seat of power, the Federal Government, were placed in the 
central area of the city. Most ancient Nigerian cities are single center cities with the ruling power 
of the city such as the Emir or the Oba, residing and ruling from the center of the city. The palace 
of the traditional ruler, however, would be enclosed in a wall.  The Three Arm Zone in the 202
Abuja Master Plan on the contrary was not enclosed in a wall, breaking with Nigeria’s 
precolonial urban traditions. Another tradition adopted by the Abuja planners was the 




Figure 3.5 Gateways into 
Central Area of Abuja. 
(Source International 
Planning Associates)
walled with gateways that restrict entrance into the city. Although the city of Abuja is not walled, 
planners of Abuja adopted their own gateways which consisted of roads from the residential 
areas and districts entering into the Central Area of Abuja (see figure 3.5).  The entrance into 203
the city of Abuja is marked by a modern free-standing gate (see figure 3.6). 
Comparison between Abuja and Dodoma  
 The plans for Abuja can be contrasted with those of the new Capital of Tanzania, 
Dodoma. The plans for Dodoma were drawn up around the same time as those of Abuja and the 
planners were also Western (the Canadian planning firm Planning Associates of Toronto headed 
by planner Macklin Hancock led the design of Dodoma). Similarly, the plan for Dodoma 
resembled a city in the foreign planner’s homeland (Dodoma bore similarities with the Canadian 
 Ibid., 12.203
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Figure 3.6 Abuja City Gate (Source atlantablackstar.com)
town of Don Mills). The plans for Dodoma, however, were more modest than their Abuja 
counterpart and featured simple, single story buildings. Unlike Nigeria, Tanzania did not 
experience an oil boom, rather the Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, described his country as 
impoverished.  Nyerere insisted that the new capital of his country would be built with 204
minimum costs and built within the country’s means. As such buildings were limited to a 
maximum of four stories and restricted from having costly features such as air conditioning and 
elevators.  Nyerere did not want investment in the capital city to come at the expense of 
development of the rural areas. Thus, Dodoma was designed as low cost city that would 
compliment and not overshadow the rural areas.  His economic plans focused on socialism 205
developing the rural areas over the city hence his reluctance to develop a grandiose capital city. 
In a bid to limit private property ownership, Dodoma’s circulation plan de-emphasized the use of 
automobiles in but instead featured bus lanes, bicycle lanes and pedestrian paths.  The Abuja 206
master plan on the other hand was less socialist and catered for private car ownership as noted by 
Omar Take a principal in Kenzo Tange’s firm: “Opinions differ, but we think that human nature 
is such that people working in this capital will want the social status of a car. It might not 
happen, but in the event that it does, it is already taken care of.”  As is evident in this quote, the 207
Abuja master plan was designed for a more prosperous resident, one who would own a car.  
 Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration, 15.204
 Ibid., 28.205
 Dodoma Master Plan, 137.206
 Omar Take, “Abuja, the New Capital of Nigeria, and the Urban Design of Its Central Area,” in Continuity and 207
Change: Design Strategies for Large-Scale Urban Development, (Cambridge: Aga Khan Program for Islamic 
Architecture, 1984), 55.
 83
 The Tanzanian postcolonial government also decided to relocate the Tanzanian capital 
from the coast to the center of the country. Unlike the case of Abuja, the transfer of the Tanzanian 
capital to the central region was not in a bid to mitigate ethnic tensions. Rather, the Tanzanian 
postcolonial government argued the transfer was in a bid to oversee the country’s economic 
development which Nyerere believed would only come through agricultural production. 
Nyerere’s government pursued a policy of Ujamaa (African socialism) which saw the formation 
of collective farms in a policy of rural and agricultural development. By relocating the capital to 
Dodoma which was located in the rural heartland, the government intended to monitor the 
implementation of the Ujamaa program.  Furthermore, the Tanzanian postcolonial government 208
argued that the transfer of the capital was motivated by a desire to develop the interior of the 
country. The colonialists had heavily invested in the infrastructure of the former capital, Dar es 
Salaam, and neglected other regions of the country. Similar to the case of Abuja, the Tanzanian 
postcolonial government also associated Dar es Salaam with the terrors of the colonial regime: 
the city’s un-African name, racial segregation, inequality, moral degradation and colonial 
exploitation. The new capital city of Dodoma was idealized as the antithesis of Dar es Salaam, an 
authentic African city of equality and hope. The Arusha Declaration, a state address given by 
President Nyerere, influenced the design of Dodoma. The major themes of the Arusha 
Declaration such as self-reliance and agriculture were used as pointers in the plan for Dodoma. 
 One major similarity between Dodoma and Abuja is the abundance of green space in the 
Master Plans. Based on the Arusha Declaration and the emphasis on self-reliance, rural 
development and land, the Dodoma Master Plan featured vast green spaces. The abundance of 
 FCO Diplomatic Report No. 474/73: The New Capital of Tanzania.208
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unoccupied land served as communal land for residents of Dodoma to grow their own food as 
well as to symbolize agriculture and the significance of land in Tanzania’s development. The 
inclusion of green spaces in the Abuja Master Plan was intended as a buffer to the growing city. 
This was a principle from modernist architects such as Le Corbusier. Tange, the urban designer 
of the Central Area, was a devotee of Le Corbusier and thus featured a National Arboretum at the 
foot of Aso Rock, dividing Aso rock from the Three Arm Zone: “the space between the crest of 
Aso Hill and the National Assembly building is proposed as a National Monument Area to 
protect it from development.”  In addition to the National Arboretum, the Abuja Master Plan 209
featured multiple national parks and Wilderness Preserves to serve as both a buffer and a 
conservation space. 
 The British were supportive of the decision to transfer the Federal capital to Abuja. In a 
1981 newspaper article, British Business projected the Federal capital move to be profitable to 
British contractors and businessmen.  In a letter to the British Department of Trade, Gordon 210
Duggan counsellor at the British High Commission in Nigeria wrote: “Abuja is a vast project of 
immense political importance and significant economic importance to Nigeria and potentially to 
British business. I think that we must take it seriously and not be overwhelmed by the sceptics 
who snipe at it from afar in the opinion of the FCDA staff.”  Several British officers 211
acknowledged the possibility for British businesses to be awarded contracts. The British 
Commission also sought to support Milton Keynes, the only British firm contracted by the 
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Nigerian government for the construction of Abuja. On the other hand, the British were against 
the transfer of the capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, seeing it as foolish, unproductive and 
a waste of resources.  
 The difference in British opinion towards Dodoma and Abuja, can be attributed to a 
number of factors. Firstly, the British perceived different investment prospects in both cities. At 
the time of the decision to transfer the Federal capital, the oil-driven Nigerian economy was 
thriving and more economically viable to foreign investors. Tanzania, on the other hand was not 
experiencing economic growth and was not as attractive to British foreign investors. 
Furthermore, the British deemed the transfer of the Tanzanian capital as an anti-modern gesture. 
Nyerere’s views on self-reliance, rural development (as explored earlier in Chapter 2), were quite 
unlike the Industrial policies pursued by most Western countries and postcolonial countries in the 
1970s.  During that time period, neither the Nigerian military nor the civilian governments 212
pursued economic policies similar to those of Tanzania. Similarly, the Abuja Master plan did not 
feature cultivation areas like those in the Dodoma Master Plan.  Thus, the British equated 213
Dodoma as one of antiquity modern 
Were the Vision and Plan for Abuja realized? 
 The plans for Abuja were jeopardized and foiled by various military coups and dictators. 
Nigeria’s political history since the decision to transfer the Capital in 1976 was a very turbulent 
and complicated one. Shagari was an avid supporter of the decision to transfer the Federal 
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Capital. In 1981, under Shagari’s rule, construction of the Federal Capital began. In his zeal for 
the new Federal Capital City, Shagari moved into the city before the city’s completion. The 
Shagari regime, however, would not rule to see the Abuja Master Plan come into full fruition. In 
the early 1980s, world prices of oil began to drop and the Nigerian economy was weakened. In a 
1981 study on Nigeria’s economic development, the International Labor Organization concluded 
that despite decades of economic growth stimulated by the oil boom, the standard of living in 
Nigerian were pitifully low.  Nigerian citizens widely accused the Shagari administration of 214
mismanagement of funds, corruption and greed.  Most notably, Shagari’s administration were 215
reported to have rigged the August-September 1983 election in which he was re-elected.  In 216
December, 1984, Shagari was overthrown and arrested in Abuja in the Shagari Presidential villa 
in a coup led by Generals Muhammudu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon.  Buhari preferred to 217
govern the country from the Dodan military barracks in Lagos. Furthermore, Buhari stalled the 
transfer of the capital. The Buhari regime associated Abuja with the excesses and corruption of 
the Shagari regime and construction stopped. Notably, the Shagari government had awarded 
several fraudulent contracts in the construction of Abuja with little to show for it.  Major 218
General Mamman Vatsa who served in the Buhari regime described Abuja as “synonymous with 
 International Labor Organization, First Things First, Meeting the Basic Needs of the People of Nigeria (Geneva: 214
ILO, 1981), v
 Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1983), 37-43.215
 Wole Soyinka, “Why Shagari couldn’t Last,”The Guardian (London) 3 January 1984.216
  Shehu Othman. “Classes, Crises and Coup: The Demise of Shagari's Regime”African Affairs 83, no.333 (1984): 217
441.
 Vale, Architecture, Power, and National Identity, 163; Garth Myers, Postcolonial Cities, 62.218
 87
patronage and waste.” Buhari’s rule, however, was short lived and he was removed by another 
military coup led by Ibrahim Babangida in 1985.   219
 Babangida was supportive of the transfer of the Capital to Abuja. Thus, in 1991, he 
transferred the Federal Government to Abuja and officially declared Abuja the Federal Capital 
City of Nigeria.  As Shagari was arrested in the Presidential villa, Babangida stigmatized the 220
Presidential villa and chose instead to erect a new presidential complex closer to Aso Rock and 
right in the middle of the national arboretum.  Thus began the various alterations and changes 221
made to the plan of Abuja. Babangida awarded land to his supporters in the national arboretum. 
During Babangida’s reign, Tange was also displaced as urban designer and lead architect. In 
1993, Babaganda stepped down from power, and chose Ernest Shonekon to take over his 
presidency. A year later, General Sani Abacha overthrew Shonekon in a bloodless coup. Abacha 
famously altered Tange’s design for the National Assembly Complex, this will be explored later 
in the chapter. Both Babangida and Abacha built military barracks in allocated green spaces and 
national parks.”  Both military leaders awarded land to their supporters in national parks.  222
 With the sudden death of Abacha in 1998, democratic rule was restored. Abacha’s 
successor, General Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar paved the way for a new democratic 
constitution and multiparty elections in 1999.  A political prisoner under Abacha, Olusegun 223
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Obasanjo was elected President, becoming the Nigerian head of state again. Obasanjo dedicated 
his rule to restoring Abuja to the original Master Plan.  Obasanjo and Former President 224
Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), however, have also been accused of diminishing the green 
spaces of Abuja and fraudulently awarding land in national parks.  The National Parks 225
envisioned in the Abuja Master Plan were never realized. As of present, phase 3 and 4 of the 
Abuja Master Plan have yet to be realized. Contrastingly, the development of Dodoma went 
according to plan as Tanzania experienced single party rule and relative political peace. Nyerere 
ruled Tanzania undisturbed until his retirement in 1985. He picked his own predecessor, Ali 
Hassan Mwinyi, who ruled Tanzania unchallenged for 20 years. 
 Ironically, Abuja was expected to promote a national Nigerian identity, however, it 
featured mainly the architectural traditions of one ethnicity and religion at the expense of other 
cultures and religions. The architecture of Abuja bears strong resemblance to the architectural 
traditions of Northern Nigeria. A major example of this is the National Assembly building (ee 
Figure 3.7). In 1996, the Abacha administration government rejected Tange’s design for the 
National Assembly Complex, viewing it as too modern. Instead, on 18 February 1996, Military 
President Abacha, a Muslim and Northerner, commissioned a Nigerian firm, I. T. B. Nigeria 
Limited, to design the National Assembly building.  In 1999, the final National Assembly 226
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Complex was finally constructed and featured a dome-like roof similar to that of the Great 
Mosque in Kano, Abacha’s hometown (see Figure 3.8).   227
 Vale, Architecture, Power and National Identity, 164.227
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Figure 3.7 National Assembly Complex (Source Vanguard, 
www.vanguardngr.com/2014/10/national-assembly-national-
minimum-wage/)
Figure 3.8 The Great Mosque of Kano (Source MIT Libraries, Agha Khan Visual Archives,) 
 Several prominent buildings in Abuja feature Islamic and Hausa architectural traditions to 
the detriment of other Nigerian architectural practices. A 2000 New York Times article on then 
US President Bill Clinton’s visit to the Nigerian Capital, noted “telltale signs of the dominance 
by Nigeria’s Muslim Northerners dot Abuja.”  The newspaper article highlighted the National 228
Mosque of Nigeria which occupies the central part of the city and arguably dominates the city’s 
landscape. Receiving double the funding allocated to constructing the National Church of 
Nigeria, the National Mosque constructed in 1984 is an elaborate building that stands out against 
the Abuja sky line (see Figure 3.9). Saudi Arabia donated $4 million towards the construction of 
 “Nigeria’s Showplace Awaits ‘Big Man’ from U.S.,” New York Times, 25 August 2000.228
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Figure 3.9 The National Mosque of Nigeria (Source Money MattersAfrica, 
www.moneymattersafrica.com/business-and-finance/nigeria-abuja-attracts-mall-developer)
the mosque.  Another illustration of strong Islamic architectural influences is the design for the 229
Federal Ministry of Finance Building which was started by Tange and completed in 1999 by 
Olajumoke Adenowo of Femi Majekodunmi Associates. The building, although modern, features 
glass and Islamic arches and pillars (see figure 3.10).  One can draw comparisons to the 230
prominence given to European cultures and figureheads in the colonial city. The dominance of 
one ethnic and religious group on the cultural landscape of Abuja complicated the mandate of 
creating an ethnically neutral city that was commemorative of Nigeria’s ethnic diversity. 
 Another major failure of Abuja is the vast inequalities that exist in the city. Ironically, 
Abuja is not segregated by race like colonial Lagos, it is segregated by class. Abuja is one of the 
most expensive cities to live in the continent. The price of property is exorbitant and the prices of 
rent astronomical. Healthcare and education are very costly with the city being home to most of 
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Figure 3.10 Federal Ministry of Finance (Source Interscope Consultants Limited, 
www.interscopeconsultants.com)
the country’s elite private schools.  The existing housing deficit for the lower and middle class 231
in Abuja has been widely noted.  As in Lagos, there are a plethora of slums in Abuja erected by 232
lower class residents. The Federal Capital Development Authority controversially has taken a 
hardline stance against slums and is known to bulldoze slums.  The Minister of the Federal 233
Capital Territory from 1986 to 1989, Air Commodore Hamza Abdullahi, expressed his distaste at 
slums: 
It is impossible for slums to develop here in Abuja. Every inch of the city has been 
predetermined. The way and manner of the structure does not allow anybody to go out of 
this original plan. If we give you a plot, you have a boundary for the plot and you cannot 
exceed that. There is what is called our land-use plan and this is our bible. We follow it 
carefully. There is absolutely no room for anybody to just start building substandard 
structures. It is impossible.   234
Nasir el-Rufai, the Minister of the Capital Territory from 2003 to 2007 also took a similar stance 
against the less privileged residents of Abuja: “We are not saying Abuja is not for poor people, 
but it is definitely not a city for idlers either.”  Thus just as part of colonial Lagos were only 235
made accessible to certain races, the city of Abuja has been made accessible to only those of a 
particular class. 
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 The Federal capital of Abuja was an ambitious project initiated by the Federal 
Government. It was intended to be a city free of the colonial legacies of ethnic and religious 
rivalry, socio-economic inequality and segregation. The city was thus hoped to unite Nigeria’s 
diverse ethnic and religious groups, promote a strong national identity and be accessible to all 
Nigerian citizens. Ultimately, Abuja was designed to avoid the pitfalls of Lagos, the former 
colonial capital. The different political ideologies, corruption and greed of several Nigerian 
leaders stood in the way of the Abuja Master Plan being fulfilled. The military dictators of the 
1990s, particularly, made significant changes to the Abuja Plan. Quite contrary to the initial 
vision, Abuja is now a city of great inequality both culturally and socio-economically. The 
cityscape is dominated by Northern and Islamic architectural features and excludes other 
cultures. Moreover, the city is unaffordable and consequently inaccessible to most members of 
the Nigerian middle and lower classes. The dominance of one ethnicity on the city’s landscape 
and the prevalence of socioeconomic inequalities were all issues present in the colonial city. In 





 The case studies of Nairobi, Dodoma and Abuja highlighted several contradictions and 
raised numerous questions in the study of decolonizing the African city. How far has the 
decolonization process gone? To what extent have postcolonial elite’s ideologies for the city truly 
reflected a decolonization process? Have postcolonial urban plans effectively reversed the 
problems of colonization? Are Africans better off in postcolonial cities than in the colonial cities?  
The primary question in all of this is what constitutes as a truly decolonized African city? 
 One can define the concept in terms of overturning and challenging colonial ideologies 
that presided over the colonial city. In the case of colonial Nairobi, the colonial ideology was to 
create a white-settler city. Thus, the presence of and occupation of the city by Black colonized 
Africans arguably served as means of decolonizing the city as it defied colonial visions of the 
city. Equally, Myers’ argument that the defiant act of establishing informal housing and 
establishing Black neighborhoods in colonial Nairobi by Africans served as a means of 
decolonization also holds.  
 Consider when the colonial ideology was racist in nature and sought to privilege one 
race, ethnicity or class over another. The successful struggle for and attainment of rights by the 
marginalized group would serve as a means towards decolonization. Thus, the somewhat 
successful strikes held by Black residents of Nairobi for inexpensive, quality housing would 
serve as a step towards decolonization. Ideally, the establishment of Dodoma as a classless city 
in which all Tanzanians of all classes were equal was a trend towards the racist and classist 
colonial legacies prevalent in Dar es Salaam. 
 Another question raised by the study is whether one can correlate decolonization with the 
absence of Western influences. In the study of the planned, relocated capitals of Abuja and 
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Dodoma, one is surprised by the hiring of Western planners and architects to design the new 
capitals. Did the use of Western professionals reduce or hinder the decolonization process? To 
what extent did the backgrounds and perspectives of the Western planners influence the final 
urban plans of the postcolonial cities? Ultimately, one cannot look at the decolonization process 
in a vacuum but must look at the international trends that existed at the time. Whilst the plan for 
Dodoma reflected Ujamaa principles, the Dodoma Master plan also bore references to the 
Garden City movement that was also popular in various global cities such as Don Mills. 
 Another significant theme that arises from the study is that one cannot study the African 
city without considering the rural areas. The African colonial city did not lie in isolation and a lot 
of the challenges faced by the city were in direct relation to the rural areas. As the case study of 
Nairobi revealed, the disenfranchisement and dispossession of Africans in the rural areas led to a 
movement of the colonized Africans. Africans that had their lands taken from them, forced to 
live in crowded native reserves and forced to pay hut taxes found it extremely difficult to survive 
financially in the rural areas. To many colonized Africans, the colonial city was the primary 
source of economic hope and opportunity. Colonial authorities often saw colonial cities as sites 
of European inhabitation, the seats of colonial administration as in the case of Nairobi or the sites 
from which resources where transported to the metropole, as was evident in the coastal cities of 
Dar es Salaam and Lagos. The emphasis on the city, led colonialists to disproportionately invest 
infrastructure in urban areas over the rural areas. Whichever way, one looked at it there was a 
great economic disparity between the urban areas and the rural areas.  
 This economic imbalance continued to reign true post-independence amongst most 
African countries. In the 1970s and early 1980s, many postcolonial governments pursued 
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economic policies of industrialization at the expense of agricultural policies. These industrial 
policies were centered in the cities and subsequently government investment primarily directed 
to the urban areas. The cities as in colonial times remained the sites of great economic prosperity 
whilst life in the rural areas became increasingly less economically viable. As noted in Chapter 3, 
in the case of Lagos, the 1970s oil boom and rural migration drove up the city’s population.  
 Moreover, in most colonial and postcolonial territories arose the colonial legacy of the 
primate city. In which only one city is economically more developed, politically more 
established and far more populated than other regions in the country. Thus despite, the creation 
of new capital cities in many postcolonial cities in Africa, primate cities still remain. The primate 
city of Nigeria till this day is Lagos which is also Africa’s most populous city. In 2015, the 
National Population Commission of Nigeria estimated the population of metropolitan Lagos to 
be 21 million people.   With the transfer of the national capital to Abuja, Lagos is no longer the 236
seat of the Federal government. Lagos, however, still is the financial hub of the city. Despite 
Nyerere’s promotion of the rural areas and conscious downplaying of Dar es Salaam, the city still 
remains the primate city of Tanzania. In 2012, the Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics 
estimated the city’s population to be 4,364,541.  Despite the transfer of the capital to Dodoma, 237
Dar es Salaam remains both the political and economic center of the country.  Nairobi 238
continues to remain unrivaled as Kenya’s primate city and is according to 2009 UN statistics is 
 Lagos Population 2016. World Population Review. Last Modified September, 13 2015, http://236
worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/lagos-population/.
 Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, Data Visualization. http://www.nbs.go.tz/237
 Emmanuel Ntabaye, “Tanzania: Will Dodoma Ever Be Tanzania’s National Capital City?”Tanzania Daily News, 238
12 February 2015
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estimated to have a population of 3,133, 518.  Several problems of the African primate city that 239
were identified by early postcolonial leaders have only been exacerbated. Overpopulation, 
housing shortages, high rent and congestion remain problems in Lagos, Dar es Salaam, and 
Kenya. It is not uncommon for Lagosians to commute 4 hours in traffic in order to work.  240
Clearly, urban challenges are not easily resolved. 
 Postcolonial theorist Franz Fanon critiqued the postcolonial emphasis on the city at the 
expense of the rural area. In his book on the post-colony, Fanon argued that the focus on the city 
itself by postcolonial leaders simply mimicked colonial policies and was “[a] commercial notion 
inherited from the colonial period.”  Fanon further argued that ideologies of the city did not 241
change since most postcolonial elite desired to inherit and/or replicate the colonial space: “The 
look that the native turns on the settler’s town is a look of lust, a look of envy; it expresses His 
dreams of possession - all manner of possession: to sit at the settler’s table, to sleep in the 
settler’s bed, with his wife if possible…there is no native who does not dream at least once a day 
of setting himself up in the settler’s place.”  Similarly, in his argument on the postcolonial 242
space Achille Mbembe asks “have we really entered another period, or do we find the same 
theater, the same mimetic acting, with different actors and spectators, but with the same 
convulsions and the same insult? Can we really talk of moving beyond colonialism?”  Bearing 243
 UN Data. City population by sex, city and city type. Last Modified January 22, 2016, http://data.un.org/239
Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode%3a240
 Emmanuel Akinwotu, “In Lagos, the traffic jams can add four hours to your commute,” City Metric, last 240
modified September 21, 2015, http://www.citymetric.com/transport/lagos-traffic-jams-can-add-four-hours-your-
commute-1406.
 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (New York: Grove Press,2014), 5.241
 Ibid., 39242
 Achille, Mbembe. On the Post Colony. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 73 243
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reference to these postcolonial thinkers, can the problems of the colonial city truly be resolved by 
relocating the national capital? As Fanon argues, perhaps the problem is the focus on the city. 
That was the focus of colonialist. Perhaps postcolonial leaders should also seek to reform the 
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